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State Securities Enforcement
Andrew K. Jennings*
Each year, state securities regulators bring over twice the
enforcement actions brought by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, yet their work is largely missing from the literature.
This Article provides an institutional account of state securities
enforcement and identifies two key advantages—detection
granularity and institutional decentralization—that states enjoy
over their federal counterparts in policing localized frauds
involving individual, often small-dollar, victims. Although states
share enforcement jurisdiction with the SEC and DOJ, their
enforcement activity reflects their institutional advantages and
constraints and thus largely does not overlap with that of federal
authorities. Instead, states serve as the nation’s residual securities
enforcers, policing local misconduct that federal authorities or
private plaintiffs largely do not. The states’ work as residual
securities enforcers should thus guide state and federal authorities
as they cooperate and complement each other’s enforcement
missions. And given the need for local investor protection,
proposals around national securities policy should bolster that
work or, at the least, mitigate negative impacts on it.
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INTRODUCTION
In every American town, where there are investors ready to
invest, there are fraudsters ready to steal. Although those
fraudsters could face investor lawsuits or enforcement from the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or federal
prosecutors, in practice state authorities often are victims’ (or
would-be victims’) only line of defense. This Article uses data
collected via public-information requests and semi-structured
interviews to provide an institutional account of how states exercise
their securities-enforcement jurisdiction, including how they
source and conduct investigations; set priorities within resource
constraints; and coordinate with other state regulators, federal
authorities, self-regulatory organizations, and local law
enforcement and prosecutors. This account frames states as
residual enforcers in the national securities-enforcement system,
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meaning that they take cases that federal authorities and private
plaintiffs cannot or will not bring.1
The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996
(NSMIA) preempted broad swaths of state securities-offering
regulation.2 Its passage marked a summit moment in the federal
government’s rise as the nation’s near-exclusive ex ante securities
regulator.3 NSMIA expressly preserved, however, states’ authority
to enforce the antifraud provisions of their securities statutes,
leaving them and the federal government with largely concurrent
jurisdictions over ex post enforcement.4 For instance, most states
have fraud prohibitions that track the SEC’s Rule 10b-5, meaning
that conduct that creates federal liability under the rule also gives
rise to state liability.5
Whether ex ante state regulation should be preempted is well
covered in the literature.6 That states’ ex post enforcement
authority has gone mostly undisturbed after the passage of NSMIA,
however, has received less consideration.7 This seems unusual
1. See Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND. L. REV.
285, 290 (2016) (“[R]edundant authority across diverse agents may respond to errors,
resource constraints, information problems, or agency costs at the level of case selection.”).
2. See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 102, Pub. L. No. 104290, 110 Stat. 3417.
3. See Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation
in the United States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 495 (2003) for a history of the development
of federal securities-regulation dominance. Federal ex ante regulatory dominance is greatest
in the context of offerings and is more broadly shared in other contexts, particularly in
broker-dealer regulation. See generally Yerv Melkonyan, Note, Regulation Best Interest and the
State-Agency Conflict, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1591 (2020) (conducting a preemption and
economic-federalism analysis of state and federal regulation of broker-dealer conduct).
4. States have a claim to even broader antifraud jurisdiction than their federal
counterparts, as state antifraud statutes typically lack a scienter requirement. See infra note
28 and accompanying text.
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
6. See Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities
Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107 (2005); Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., The Insidious Remnants of
State Rules Respecting Capital Formation, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 407 (2003); Manning Gilbert Warren
III, Reflections on Dual Regulations of Securities: A Case for Reallocation of Regulatory Responsibilities,
78 WASH U. L.Q. 497 (2000); Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State
Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273 (1998); Roberta Romano, Empowering
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998).
7. But see Amanda M. Rose & Larry J. LeBlanc, Policing Public Companies: An Empirical
Examination of the Enforcement Landscape and the Role Played by State Securities Regulators, 65 FLA.
L. REV. 395 (2013); Amanda M. Rose, State Enforcement of National Policy: A Contextual Approach
(with Evidence from the Securities Realm), 97 MINN. L. REV. 1343 (2013); Carlos Berdejó, Small
Investments, Big Losses: The States’ Role in Protecting Local Investors from Securities Fraud, 92 WASH.
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because compared to their federal counterparts, states bring more
securities-enforcement actions. Between 2012 and 2018, for example,
the SEC brought on average 774 administrative and civil actions a
year,8 and from 2013 to 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
secured on average 234 criminal convictions a year against
individuals for securities violations (e.g., insider trading or offering
fraud).9 During the same period, state regulators brought on average
1,826 administrative and civil actions annually, 139% more than the
SEC.10 Although data on state-law securities prosecutions are
incomplete, from 2013 to 2017, states brought on average at least 256
criminal cases a year, slightly more than DOJ’s average.11
Aggregate enforcement statistics do not tell the full story. After
all, things like books-and-records violations at a broker-dealer or
delinquent filings by a public issuer require fewer resources to
address than an investigation into a complex accounting fraud.12
These aggregates thus raise several questions: Given their largely
concurrent enforcement jurisdictions, do state and federal
authorities overlap or duplicate each other’s efforts? Or, is there
instead a division of labor between them in which each tackles
distinct cases, making their efforts complementary? The answer, in
short, is that state and federal authorities tend not to overlap in
their enforcement activity despite overlapping in their enforcement
jurisdiction, suggesting that they complement each other as public
securities enforcers. This answer points to securities fraud as
sometimes taking the form of financial street crime. It helps
spotlight states’ advantages within a national system of
enforcement that includes federal authorities (including selfL. REV. 567 (2017) (analyzing state securities enforcement with a focus on victim restitution);
Wendy Gerwick Couture, Principles for State Prosecution of Securities Crime in a Dual-Regulatory,
Multi-Enforcer Regime, 22 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 30 (2019) (examining and recommending principles
for the exercise of states’ criminal securities jurisdiction).
8. See infra APPENDIX, Table 1.
9. See infra APPENDIX, Table 2.
10. See infra APPENDIX, Table 1.
11. See infra APPENDIX, Table 2.
12. But cf. Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s Enforcement
Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 933–47 (2016) (showing that metrics in the SEC’s annual
reports do not provide reliable views of enforcement levels because they inconsistently count
follow-on actions, single actions against multiple defendants, and multiple actions against a
single defendant).
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regulatory organizations like the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA)) and private plaintiffs. This finding suggests
that state and federal authorities, given mutual resource constraints
and distinct enforcement missions, do not over enforce by pursuing
the same violations.
This Article proceeds in four parts, each drawing from public
records collected from the states. It adds color to these records
through interviews conducted with 61 current and former state
securities enforcers covering 36 states, as well as 11 individuals
who have worked adjacent to state enforcers as private attorneys,
as federal enforcers, or in similar roles.13
Part I reviews the statutory scheme for concurrent state and
federal enforcement jurisdiction over securities violations. It
outlines broad areas of overlapping jurisdiction, while identifying
differences between state and federal enforcement activity in terms
of the targets they police. This Part organizes state enforcement
actions into two categories: violations by registered issuers,
broker-dealers, investment advisers, and their licensed
representatives (registered violations), and violations by
unregistered issuers and individuals (unregistered violations).14
For both categories, states tend to bring actions that involve some
form of theft, as opposed to compliance-based violations that
would not be expected to have direct, identifiable victims.15 This
Part observes that state enforcement activity focuses on actions that
impose direct harm on individual victims and would-be victims (as
opposed to actions that impose diffuse harm on many parties, like
material misstatements in public-company disclosures that harm
large numbers of investors). State enforcement activity also focuses
on harms to in-state residents, especially high-risk groups like the
elderly, in contrast to SEC actions that generally address harms that
cross state and national borders.16

13. Interviews were conducted by phone, primarily in January and February 2020, on
a non-attribution basis. Calls were also held in summer 2019 as part of an earlier stage of this
project. In some cases, there were multiple calls with the same interviewee. Some interviews
were conducted jointly with two or more individuals from the same office. Because of the
sensitive nature of these interviews, citations depart slightly from the Bluebook format.
14. See infra Section I.B.
15. See id.; see also infra APPENDIX, Tables 4 and 9.
16. See infra Section II.C.
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Part I also examines securities violations in terms of the
characteristics of victims and the substantive violations. That
examination impresses that for each Enron, countless fraudulent
oil-and-gas investment contracts are sold, and that for each Madoff,
there are a hundred Ponzi schemes next door.17 What this Article
calls “local” frauds, in other words, are different in character and
degree from high-profile or high-dollar cases that lead to
publicized enforcement or significant private litigation and thus
garner scholarly, policy, and press attention.18 This Article, in
contrast, focuses on the local frauds that predominate in state
public enforcement: acts whose offenders and victims engage in
discrete transactions, even if the offender has multiple victims or
commits multiple acts against the same victim. Typical local
violations
include
affinity-group,
real-estate,
and
private-placement frauds whose victims might lose $5,000, $50,000,
or $500,000. These are relatively small sums in the scale of the
capital markets, but they are significant—potentially life altering—
for individuals.19 “National” public-enforcement cases, in contrast,
would be expected to address aggregate conduct that harms
markets or many investors at once, such as insider trading or
material misstatements in public-company disclosures. They also
include violations that are structurally similar to local frauds but
that are more easily policed by a national enforcer because of their
large scale, high investor losses, or interstate nature. An example
would be an interstate Ponzi scheme with hundreds of victims and
millions in losses.
To give context for the political and resources constraints that
shape state enforcement activity, Part II outlines the diverse
institutional structures behind state enforcement. A third of
regulators, for instance, are led by elected officials, while only three
17. See infra APPENDIX, Table 3.
18. See infra Section I.A; see also infra APPENDIX, Tables 10–12; Jayne W. Barnard,
Securities Fraud, Recidivism, and Deterrence, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 189, 191 (2008) (discussing
securities fraudsters who do not commit “the systemic, organizational frauds that command
the attention of the popular press” but rather “engage in ‘retail’ securities fraud—sales made
to investors on a one-on-one basis and schemes . . . designed to induce individual trades.”).
19. See infra note 300 and accompanying table; see also, e.g., Grand Jury Indictment,
People v. Gollehon, Case No. 13CR0001, at *2 (City & Cnty. of Denver, Colo., Dist. Ct. 2013)
(on file with author) (indicting a promoter of video-game-development securities alleged to
have defrauded $885,930 from ninety-five individuals).
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are (like the SEC) standalone securities agencies. Five are part of
an attorney general’s office,20 while some are located within
agencies that also carry out their states’ insurance, banking, or
consumer-finance regulatory functions.21 Others are part of
agencies that have distinctly non-financial regulatory
responsibilities, including professional boxing and public
utilities.22 After presenting this typology, Part II reviews how state
enforcers perceive of themselves and their roles, set priorities under
resource constraints, educate the public and fellow in-state
agencies, and participate in policy processes. These perceptions in
turn support the notion that states function as residual securities
enforcers and evidence the advantages they enjoy in that role.
Part III shows how state enforcers work, from the time they
receive a complaint or referral, to the point that they reach
settlement or bring an adversarial action. Civil violations of state
securities laws are often also crimes. This Part explains how
enforcers determine when prosecution is merited and how they
work with federal, state, and local prosecutors on criminal cases.
This Part also outlines what is perhaps the most significant part of
the residual enforcer function: state regulators serve as hubs within
securities-enforcement networks. This Part explains how as hubs,
state regulators coordinate and cooperate with in-state agencies,
sister state regulators, federal counterparts, FINRA, and private
plaintiffs to channel cases to appropriate enforcers. A subset of that
coordination are multistate coalitions formed to tackle systemic
product and financial-industry issues.
Based on this institutional account, Part IV concludes that state
and federal authorities generally do not overlap in their
enforcement activity and indeed regularly refer cases among
themselves that better match each other’s advantages. Within the
national enforcement system, state and federal securities
enforcement are complementary, with these authorities following
allocations reflective of each actor exploiting its advantages,
adhering to its institutional constraints, and pursuing its perceived
20. See infra Section II.A; infra APPENDIX, Table 5.
21. See infra Section II.A; infra APPENDIX, Table 5.
22. See MICH. DEP’T OF LICENSING & REGUL. AFFS., CORPS., SECS. & COM. LICENSING
BUREAU, https://www.michigan.gov/lara/0,4601,7-154-89334_61343—-,00.html (last visited Oct.
16, 2021) (boxing licenses); VA. STATE CORP. COMM’N, https://www.scc.virginia.gov/
(last visited Oct. 16, 2021) (public utilities).
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enforcement mission.23 This Part also identifies two key advantages
states enjoy over their federal counterparts in policing local frauds.
First, their detection abilities are more granular because they
can foster state and local enforcement networks. That means that
local police, adult protective services, and similar agencies—as the
agencies most likely to first learn of potential violations—can
channel leads to the state regulator. In effect, securities regulators
have an indirect presence in each community in their states, a force
multiplier that a national enforcer like the SEC lacks and would be
hard-pressed to replicate.
And second, state securities enforcement is decentralized,
reducing the risk of regulatory myopia or capture. Not only are
state regulators independent of each other, but almost all states
have at least two levels of potential public enforcement in the form
of the civil regulator as well as state and local criminal prosecutors.
Any one enforcement agency can become myopic in focus,
methods, or policy. This risk can be overcome, though, when
in-state and state-to-state cooperation spur technical and policy
innovation and contribute to enforcement trend spotting. This same
effect can reduce the risk of regulatory capture.
These advantages impress that NSMIA’s preservation of state
enforcement jurisdiction was not a mere nod to federalism, but it
instead was a reflection of the need for public enforcement on behalf
of local securities-fraud victims who lack plausible recourse via
federal or private enforcement. This Article’s institutional account
shows that state enforcers not only have advantages over the SEC
and DOJ in policing local violations, but as residual enforcers they
are often the only line of public defense against local violations.
I. WHAT IS STATE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT?
The optimality of overlapping public and private securities
enforcement is a longstanding question in the literature.24 Several
actors in that debate are heavily studied, including the SEC, private
23. See James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws,
100 CALIF. L. REV. 115 (2012) (supporting a multienforcer securities system given the
comparative advantages of different enforcers).
24. See Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A
Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173 (2010), for a thorough analysis of this question.
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securities plaintiffs and their attorneys, the DOJ, and self-regulatory
organizations like FINRA. This Article advances the literature with
an institutional account of a group of actors that are understudied
yet nevertheless integral to an understanding of securities
enforcement in the United States: state securities regulators, along
with their fellow in-state agencies like local police departments and
prosecutors. In doing so, it identifies advantages these actors’
enforcement efforts enjoy over their federal counterparts.
Those advantages have quietly influenced the structure of
public securities enforcement in the United States. For instance,
although state and federal enforcers share largely concurrent
enforcement jurisdiction, in practice they roughly allocate
enforcement between securities violations that are essentially local
or regional (state) and essentially national or international (federal)
in nature. That means that states predominately focus on
violations—as when an investor buys fraudulent promissory notes
directly from a promoter—that occur intrastate and that involve
personal contact between offenders and victims. Federal enforcers,
meanwhile, predominantly focus on violations that are interstate or
international in nature or that implicate aggregated harms to
markets or victims with an indirect relationship to the offender.
A. Comparing State and Federal Securities Enforcement
NSMIA preempts state ex ante regulation of many securities
transactions, including those involving publicly listed companies and
certain private placements, while it preserves states’ “jurisdiction
under [their own laws] . . . to investigate and bring enforcement
actions with respect to fraud or deceit, or unlawful conduct by a
broker or dealer, in connection with securities or securities
transactions.”25 NSMIA’s follow-up statute, the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), reaffirms that “State
securities regulation is of continuing importance, together with
Federal regulation of securities, to protect investors and promote

25. See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 102, Pub. L. No. 104290, 110 Stat. 3417. It also maintains state authority to require notice filings of federally
covered offerings, a reservation that both preserves filing-fee revenue and facilitates capitalmarkets surveillance. See id. (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)).
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strong financial markets”26 and carves out actions brought by state
actors from restrictions it imposes on state-law securities claims.27
Together, NSMIA and SLUSA preserve roughly equal, and
concurrent, enforcement jurisdiction between federal and state civil
enforcers and prosecutors. Under Rule 10b-5, the SEC could, for
example, bring an action against the promoter of a small-dollar
promissory-note scam. For its part, a state regulator following
Section 501 of the Uniform Securities Act, the state analog of Rule
10b-5, could bring an action against a public company for
accounting misstatements that harm its in-state investors.28 State
regulators can even bring actions for some conduct for which the
SEC cannot: Section 501 lacks Rule 10b-5’s scienter requirement,
thus allowing states to bring fraud actions for conduct that was
merely negligent.29 Some states go even further. Under the Texas
Securities Act, for example, securities fraud includes
unconscionably “gross or exorbitant” underwriting commissions,
expanding the kinds of actions Texas can bring.30
Despite this concurrent jurisdiction, the SEC would not
typically be expected to charge a promoter of a small-dollar fraud,
nor would a state be expected to pursue a public company for
misstatements in its SEC filings. There are exceptions, but a
local/national enforcement allocation roughly holds.31 The states
bring nearly two-and-a-half times the number of administrative
and civil enforcement actions brought by the SEC.32 This comparison
is apples-to-apples in some respects but apples-to-oranges in

26. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 2, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(2).
28. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 501 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L., amended 2005).
29. Id.
30. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4, § F (West 2003).
31. Although this heuristic does not always hold, it is useful to think of state enforcement
in terms of individual-victim frauds versus frauds on the market. See Rose, supra note 24, at
2206 (concluding that economics-of-federalism scholarship would support “assigning the
federal government responsibility for deterring fraud in the national securities markets, while
assigning state governments responsibility for deterring fraud targeted at their respective local
capital markets”). But see People v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 65 Misc. 3d 1233(A), at *30 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Dec. 10, 2019) (finding that the New York attorney general failed to establish that
ExxonMobil made material misstatements regarding climate change).
32. See supra notes 8, 10 and accompanying text.
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others. Compare apples to apples: in 2018, for example, states
brought 245 actions against broker-dealers or their agents, whereas
the SEC brought 169 broker-dealer actions.33 These state and federal
actions would generally deal with similar issues: unsuitable
recommendations, compliance failures, books-and-records
violations, and the like.34 Then there is apples to oranges: in 2018,
the SEC brought 121 actions for delinquent filings, 13 for foreign
corrupt practices, 51 for insider trading, and 33 for market
manipulation, violations that state regulators in many cases would
lack capacity for or obvious jurisdiction over.
This chart sketches the rough allocation between the
enforcement activity (but not necessarily the jurisdiction) of the
SEC and state securities regulators:35
Subject Matter
Broker-Dealers
(including registered representatives)

SEC
✓

States
✓
(in-state branches/licensees)

Investment Advisers
(including associated persons)

> $100m assets under management
< $100m assets under management

✓
✘
(possible exceptions)

✘
(possible exceptions)

✓

Offering-Related Fraud
“Higher” Investor Losses
“Lower” Investor Losses

✓
✘
(with exceptions)

✘
(with exceptions)

✓

33. Compare infra APPENDIX, Table 10, with APPENDIX, Table 11. This comparison is a
rough one. Included in both denominators are non-harm actions (e.g., books-and-records
violations and delinquent filings) for which no investor monetary relief would be ordered.
It is, nevertheless, consistent with the observations of interviewees that the cases brought by
the SEC that involve investor harm tend to have higher loss levels.
34. Indeed, it is not surprising that Congress’s establishment of a dual ex ante
registration system for the broker-dealer industry would, contra this Article’s general claim,
result in overlapping enforcement between national actors like the SEC and FINRA, on one
hand, and states on the other.
35. This chart refers to expected actual enforcement activity, rather than actual
enforcement jurisdiction that either the SEC or states have.
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Public-Issuer Reporting and Disclosure

✓

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

✓

Insider Trading

✓

Market Manipulation

✓

Self-Regulatory Organizations (SRO)/
National Exchanges/Transfer Agents

✓

47:1 (2021)
✘
(possible exceptions)

✘
✘
(possible exceptions)

✘
(with exceptions)

✘

Another comparison can be made using regulators’
investigation-to-complaint ratios. In 2018, for example, state
regulators received 5,414 tips and complaints and conducted 5,320
investigations—many, but not all, of which would have been
opened based on complaints—a 965:1,000 investigation-to-complaint
ratio.36 That same year, the SEC received 19,000 tips and complaints
and opened 869 investigations—again, some, but not all, were
sourced from complaints—a 46:1,000 ratio.37 These ratios suggest
that complaints or tips to state regulators are more likely to trigger
an investigation than would a complaint or tip to the SEC.
This comparison does not necessarily imply that the states are
more responsive than the SEC. The SEC’s lower ratio might, for
instance, indicate that it receives multiple tips for the same issue,
that it receives frivolous tips, or that it refers complaints to other
agencies like state regulators. The states’ ratio, on the other hand,
might suggest that they receive a higher proportion of unique
complaints, perhaps directly from victims. These distinctions are
consistent with how current and former enforcers interviewed for
this Article described their typical cases: individuals complain of
$5,000, $50,000, or $500,000 losses from investments that
investigation shows to have been affinity, Ponzi, or similar frauds.38
These loss amounts generally fall below a threshold that the SEC or

36. See infra APPENDIX, Table 11.
37. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FY 2020 Budget Request by Program, in FISCAL YEAR 2020
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN 21, 25 (2020).
38. Interviewee #6 (describing typical losses); Interviewee #29 (same); see also infra
APPENDIX, Table 3.
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a U.S. attorney’s office would have a capacity or interest to act
upon.39 Although those sums are small in the scale of the capital
markets, they can be personally devastating for individual victims,
often representing all or a substantial portion of a victim’s
investable assets.40 Some investors, for instance, lose their homes.41
And where there is one small-dollar victim, there are often more.
Complaints can spark investigations that uncover dozens, even
hundreds, of other victims.42 For instance, victims of affinity frauds
can be found clustered in the complainant’s religious, ethnic, or
professional community.43
B. Enforcement Categories
Cases fall into two categories: violations by registered
issuers, broker-dealers, investment advisers, and their licensed
representatives (registered violations); and violations by
unregistered issuers and individuals (unregistered violations).
Of the two, interviewees considered unregistered violations to be
the bulk of their caseloads,44 a view that first appears inconsistent with
aggregate state enforcement data. From 2012 to 2018, roughly 31% of
enforcement respondents were unregistered firms or individuals,
whereas about 61% were broker-dealers, investment advisers, or their

39. See Interviewee #30 (observing that state regulators “do the exams, they’re in
front of people, and their threshold for being able to say we want to make a case is lower
than the SEC”).
40. See Interviewee #48 (“In terms of victim impacts, the dollar losses are a little bit
lower than what one might expect looking at big SEC cases, or a big class action, but the
victim impact . . . is higher as a result because it’s frequently all of their investable assets.”).
Interviewee #42 described the enormous harm some victims experience: “You see marriages
break up. You see people who become depressed. We have had victims who’ve taken their
lives because they’re so devastated. Thank God it doesn’t happen very often. There’s a lot of
shame. Sometimes people do everything right and still get taken advantage of.”
41. Cf. Interviewee #4 (reporting that awards from the state’s securities restitution
fund allowed some defrauded investors to stay in their homes).
42. Cf. Interviewee #26 (discussing a criminal securities prosecution involving several
hundred victims); Interviewee #57 (“At times we will ask for lists of all other investors in the
state so we can interview as many as possible.”).
43. See Interviewee #26 (discussing affinity fraud in the state); Interviewee #28 (same);
Interviewee #29 (same); Interviewee #36 (same).
44. Interviewee #32 (“About 75% of the things we see are unregistered and 25%
registered.”); Interviewee #40 (“Many things that we see are unregistered activity.”);
Interviewee #48 (“[T]he majority of what I’ve seen during my . . . tenure is what I would
qualify as unregistered violations.”).
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representatives.45 That inconsistency is partly explained, however,
by the qualitative differences between registered and unregistered
violations: although registered cases exceed unregistered cases in
count, unregistered enforcement requires more time and greater
investigative resources. In 2017, for example, Florida brought 105
actions for books-and-records violations, versus 69 for unregistered
activity.46 Books-and-records violations would tend to be uncovered
through routine examinations of broker-dealer branches and
investment advisers and would be evident through straight-ahead
document review or on-site interviews. The latter category, although
fewer in number, would require greater time and resources to
investigate, thus taking up the bulk of regulators’ enforcement
capacity. Florida’s sixty-nine unregistered violations, for example,
would require intaking complaints; obtaining and reviewing
documents from victims, targets, and third parties; and interviewing
persons with relevant knowledge.47 In some states, investigations of
unregistered activity would include executing search warrants and
empaneling grand juries.48
The conduct underlying unregistered violations might also be
more salient for enforcers. Interviewees reported that there is
relatively little theft-like misconduct in the registered space, as
opposed to technical, compliance-based violations. In the
unregistered space, however, theft is the focus, versus naïve
violations, such as entrepreneurs who unlawfully offer securities
for otherwise legitimate businesses.49 That is not to say that state
45. See infra APPENDIX, Table 10. Broker-dealers are regulated under both the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and state securities statutes. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (registration
of broker-dealers); UNIF. SEC. ACT art. 4 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L.,
amended 2005) (registration of broker-dealers and their agents); supra note 34 (discussing the
overlapping enforcement effects of dual registration of broker-dealers). In general,
investment advisers with under $100 million in assets under management are regulated
exclusively by state regulators, whereas investment advisers over that threshold are
regulated exclusively by the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a)–(b).
46. See infra APPENDIX, Table 9.
47. See Interviewee #29 (discussing intake procedures); Interviewee #34 (discussing
document review and interview procedures for unregistered investigations and noting the
comparative efficiency of examination-based investigations).
48. Cf. Interviewee #4 (“Unregistered activity is more criminally charged than
registered activity; we usually handle that administratively.”).
49. In one anecdote, an enforcer mentioned an entrepreneur who illegally issued a
substantial number of real-estate–related securities, a common vehicle for local securities
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regulators do not uncover serious violations by registered firms.50
Interviewees noted that states examine state-registered investment
advisers more often that the SEC examines federally-registered
firms.51 They do find violations there, particularly by small firms
that fail to establish appropriate compliance programs.52 National
and regional firms are by no means spotless. In the Morgan Keegan
case, for example, customers lost approximately $1.5 billion in bond
funds that failed during the 2008 crisis.53 A multistate investigation
found that brokers at that firm engaged in material misstatements
and omissions, unsuitable recommendations, and other customerharming violations.54 In one smoking-gun email produced to state

frauds. Interviewee #25. The regulator’s investigation, however, found that the enterprise
was legitimate, that the entrepreneur did not make material misstatements or omissions to
investors, and that the entrepreneur had long since become compliant with the state’s
regulations. Id. Given the absence of theft and the entrepreneur’s subsequent compliance,
the regulator declined to bring charges. Id.
50. One interviewee expressed concern that some states overly focus on technical
violations by firms and licensees—rather than more substantive violations that have directly
harmed investors—because the former cases are easier to bring. Interviewee #30. There was
limited suggestion in the interviews, however, that states eschew harder (but more
substantive) cases in favor of easier (but more technical) ones. See Interviewee #42:
If you looked at some of our cases in the late 90s, you’d see we issued hundreds
per year; they were all cookie cutter. We didn’t know if people selling over the
phone were using their real names; we never got service. They may have changed
names. One of my focuses is things happening in the state, where at least they met
or know the person. Maybe it’s over the Internet, but we’re fairly certain of the
name and we can serve them.
51. Between the 2013 and 2018 fiscal years, the SEC examined on average twelve
percent of federally registered investments advisers per year. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
FY 2020 Annual Performance Plan, in FISCAL YEAR 2020 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION
ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN 97, 99 (2020); see also Interviewee #60 (describing a schedule in
which state-registered investment advisers are examined every three years, including
random suitability reviews of client files). To the extent that FINRA’s examination and
enforcement efforts may be influenced by the industry it self-regulates, state regulators offer
a check. See generally Benjamin P. Edwards, The Dark Side of Self-Regulation, 85 U. CIN. L. REV.
573 (2017) (examining the role of industry representatives in FINRA governance).
52. See Interviewee #2 (discussing issues with state-registered investment advisers).
53. Liz Skinner & Andrew Osterland, Morgan Keegan on the Block After $210M
Settlement?, INVESTMENTNEWS (Sept. 20, 2011), https://www.investmentnews.com/
morgan-keegan-on-the-block-after-210m-settlement-37101.
54. See Joint Notice of Intent to Revoke Registration and Impose Administrative
Penalty at 50, Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., Ala. Sec. Comm’n SC-2010-0016 (Apr. 7, 2010)
[hereinafter Joint Notice of Intent]. Other states also joined this settlement and their own
enforcement orders contain roughly identical language to the Alabama/Kentucky/
Mississippi/South Carolina order. See, e.g., Consent Order, Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., Mo.
Sec’y of State, Case No. AP-11-24 (Dec. 13, 2011).
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investigators, a Morgan Keegan executive expressed concern about
the firm’s risky RMK bond fund and how it was marketed to
unwitting investors.55 As the next Parts will show, those kinds of
concrete harms to identifiable investors motivate how state
regulators spend their limited enforcement resources.
II. WHO ARE STATE SECURITIES ENFORCERS?
This Part analyzes the institutional, political, and resource
constraints that state enforcers operate under. This analysis sheds light
on the role they serve within their own communities and, indirectly,
their function within the national securities-enforcement system.
A slogan among state enforcers is that they are “the local cops
on the securities beat.”56 This slogan is both an assertion of the role
of state enforcement as well as a description of what they do dayto-day.57 Interviewees characterized their institutional missions as
being focused on investor protection—particularly of in-state and
at-risk investors (like the elderly)—and, to a lesser degree, capital
formation. Enforcers pursue these missions through three core
functions: registration and licensing, audits and examinations, and
enforcement. Although this Article focuses on enforcement, the
investor-protection mission imbues registration and examinations
as well, supporting their prophylactic functions by implicit
enforcement threats, including the denial or revocation of
registrations, fines, or other sanctions. Given that federal policy has
eroded states’ ex ante regulatory authority, interviewees couched
their capital-formation missions in terms of their investorprotection function; in policing against fraud, they promote capital

55. Joint Notice of Intent, supra note 54, at 32.
56. The Role of State Securities Regulators in Protecting Investors: Hearing on Efforts to
Enforce Securities Laws, Investment Advisor Registration and Licensing, State Investigations into
Mutual Fund Industry Abuses, and Investor Education Programs Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Hous. & Urb. Affs., 108th Cong. 34 (2004) (statement of Ralph A. Lambiase, President, N. Am.
Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n) (“We have been called the ‘local cops on the securities beat,’ and I believe
that is an accurate characterization.”); Interviewee #70 (“You’ve heard the term ‘local cop on
the beat,’ but it’s true. You get walk-in complaints. They want face time. It helps for public
service: you’re not writing some bureaucracy or concrete building in Washington. We’re
here. We can go do an exam. Records, we can get them more readily.”).
57. A fourth function, education and outreach, supports the core functions. See infra
Section II.D.
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formation by bolstering investor confidence and channeling capital
toward legitimate markets.58
Defining some key terms is in order. The institutional structures
of state securities regulators vary wildly. The Texas State Securities
Board, for example, is a standalone agency. The North Carolina
Securities Division, in contrast, is a unit within the secretary of
state’s office. The institutional unit of analysis in this Article is the
office that contains three core functions of securities regulation:
registration and licensing, audits and examinations, and
enforcement. Larger and better-funded regulators have dedicated
investor-education functions as well. This Article refers to those
core units as “regulators,” or “divisions”; “agencies” means their
parent agencies. A few standalone regulators, like the Texas State
Securities Board, are themselves agencies. “Other agencies” or “instate agencies” refer to the network of local and state agencies that
state securities regulators potentially work with, including local
and state police, prosecutors and attorneys general, adult
protective services, and insurance and banking regulators. This
generic structure can be seen in the following figure:

58. Registration and licensing protect the public by facilitating intrastate capitalmarket surveillance and vetting those seeking to enter local broker-dealer or investmentadviser industries. Examiners work to ensure compliance by broker-dealers and investment
advisers with industry regulations. See Interviewee #45 (“[W]hat if the $200,000 invested in
a scam went into a well-diversified portfolio? It’s good for an investor, good for the markets.
How many of these dollars that get ripped off in the unregistered space could have made it
into the legitimate markets[?]”).
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A. Institutional Structures
Former New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer was dubbed,
or perhaps dubbed himself, the “Sheriff of Wall Street.”59 He
occupied a uniquely positioned sheriff’s office that not only
physically sits at the heart of the U.S. capital markets60 but that also
has the Martin Act, a capacious antifraud statute, at the center of its
enforcement arsenal.61 Given these advantages, the New York
attorney general is perhaps the nation’s most prominent state
59. Rebecca Leung, The Sheriff of Wall Street, CBS (May 23, 2003),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-sheriff-of-wall-street/ (“Spitzer deputized himself
the Sheriff of Wall Street.”); see generally PETER ELKIND, ROUGH JUSTICE: THE RISE AND FALL
OF ELIOT SPITZER (2010).
60. Investor Protection Bureau, N.Y. STATE ATT’Y GEN., https://ag.ny.gov/investorprotection/contact (last visited Oct. 18, 2021) (listing 28 Liberty Street, just steps away
from the New York Stock Exchange on Wall Street, as the location of the Investor
Protection Bureau).
61. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-C (Consol. 2014).
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securities enforcer. It is, however, not a typical securities regulator,
just as Eliot Spitzer was not a typical agency leader.62 At the same
time, New York’s sister regulators are institutionally heterogenous,
suggesting that there is not “typical” securities division.
Start with subject-matter jurisdiction. State agencies responsible
for securities regulation are exclusive or non-exclusive to
securities. The exclusive regulators, like the SEC, are self-contained
agencies whose sole jurisdiction is securities. Only three states—
Alabama, Oklahoma, and Texas—have exclusive regulators.63
The non-exclusive agencies include sixteen that house other financial
regulators—like banking, insurance, or consumer finance—as well
as the thirty-two that conduct nonfinancial regulation, such as public
utilities, sports agents, or professional boxing.64 The latter group
includes five states—Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York,
and South Carolina—that locate securities regulation within an
attorney general’s office.65 Regulators are not only heterogenous in
their institutional structures but also in their leadership, with a clear
divide between elected and appointed leaders. Seventeen have
parent agencies with elected leaders, including attorneys general (4),
secretaries of state (9), auditors (2), corporation commissioners (1),
and an insurance commissioner (1).66 Thirty-four have parent

62. In their statistical study of state securities actions against public companies from
2004 to 2006 (years when Spitzer served as attorney general), Amanda Rose and Larry
LeBlanc treated New York as a distinct variable of their regression analysis. Rose & LeBlanc,
supra note 7, at 420 nn.63 & 66.
63. See infra APPENDIX, Table 5. The Arkansas State Securities Department was an
independent agency until July 2021. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-43-302(a)(26) (2021)
(effective July 28, 2021) (transferring the State Securities Department to the newly formed
Department of Commerce). A number of interviewees cited the Alabama Securities
Commission as exemplary, including its ability to develop criminal cases, its use of
technology in investigations, and its commitment of substantial resources to public
education. See, e.g., Interviewee #34 (“I hate to brag about Alabama, but [they have] a
whole department for investor education and more people in that department than we
have in our division here.”). Part of the Alabama Securities Commission’s success is likely
related to its being a standalone agency with self-funding; the agency has also been led by
director Joseph Borg, whose leadership is widely recognized in the field, for a quarter
century. See Jean Eaglesham, In Alabama, Beware the Borg, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2011, 12:01
AM), wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704031004576098960147787954. The Texas State
Securities Board, another standalone agency, also has one of the states’ most robust state
enforcement operations.
64. See infra APPENDIX, Table 5.
65. Infra APPENDIX, Table 5.
66. Infra APPENDIX, Table 5.
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agencies whose leaders are gubernatorial appointees, whereas
two (New Hampshire and Virginia) are chosen by legislatures.
Five have parent agencies led by boards, four appointed and one
popularly elected.67
A natural question arises around elected-versus-appointed
leadership: What impact, if any, does it have on securities
enforcement? Amanda Rose and Larry LeBlanc addressed this
question in their study of state enforcement actions disclosed in
public-company SEC filings for the 2004, 2005, and 2006 fiscal
years.68 They found elected leadership—especially Democratic
elected leadership—to be associated with higher enforcement
levels against public companies, particularly against out-of-state
firms.69 This result is consistent with a hypothesis that elected
officials have political incentives to engage in enforcement
entrepreneurism. New York and Massachusetts, for example, are
led by elected officials and are seen by many as entrepreneurial
enforcers; some interviewees joined in this view that certain states
are active enforcers due to the political incentives of their elected
leaders. Rose and LeBlanc offer support for that view.70
Interviewees, however, offered another view of how agency
leadership interacts with state enforcement. Importantly, the Rose
and LeBlanc study focused on the 102 state enforcement actions
disclosed by public companies for fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006,
an average of thirty-four state actions against public companies per
year.71 Although aggregate state enforcement data are not available
for those years, using the recent nadir of state enforcement—1,744
actions in 2016—that public-company average would represent a
relatively small share of cases, about two percent annually.72 This
67. See infra APPENDIX, Table 5.
68. Rose & LeBlanc, supra note 7.
69. Id. at 425.
70. When presented with a hypothetical critic who viewed state regulators as using
SEC enforcement actions to piggyback penalties, one interviewee acknowledged that this
practice occurs but is rare. Interviewee #45. The interviewee gave an example in which the
SEC took an enforcement action against a firm that would disqualify it from doing business
within the state. The state might waive the disqualification in return for a fine, rather than
conditioning the waiver on remediation. Id.
71. See Rose & LeBlanc, supra note 7, at 401. But see infra note 280 (discussing the
multistate coordination underlying some of the occurrences in the Rose and LeBlanc study).
72. See infra APPENDIX, Table 1.

86

87

State Securities Enforcement

ratio suggests that actions against public companies, which would
be the most likely to garner headlines for elected agency leaders,
are not a priority for state enforcers. Indeed, interviewees reported
that they generally experience little to no political influence or input
into their day-to-day enforcement activities. More, those in states
with politically right-leaning governments reported conducting
basic street-level enforcement without impediment.73
Yet although they may not be a priority, states do bring cases that
involve public companies, the financial industry, or even whole
product lines. Interviewees familiar with the internal workings of
states that are commonly believed to engage in enforcement
entrepreneurism offered an explanation at odds with the view that
enforcement against public companies is driven by elected officials.
Instead, career staff source and develop investigations.74
Although career staff keep senior executives informed, particularly
on potentially newsworthy cases, they did not experience top-down
direction on what types of cases they should pursue.75 Another
enforcer noted that although the securities division operates fairly
autonomously within the parent agency, the elected leader does like
to tout securities cases when speaking to community groups in part
because they are “unusual” from a jurisdictional perspective.76 One
former enforcer in an entrepreneurial state stressed that the

73. See, e.g., Interviewee #53:
Philosophically, the office wants to encourage responsible business, wants them
operating in the state and to encourage and support the business community. But
they know part of that is having a watchdog that will go after bad guys. We’re
business friendly, conservative generally, the state and the politics, but politics
don’t really play into a lot of what we do here[.]
74. See, e.g., Interviewee #38:
[A]ny type of subpoena or enforcement action that might get significant attention
outside the office would be run by top leadership, not necessarily the [senior-most
leader], but the top executives under the [senior-most leader] would at least know
what’s happening. . . . If it’s to [a major bank], you want leadership to know. It
doesn’t mean they’re going to have an issue with it, but it’s better for them to know.
75. There is some indication, including in the interviews, that former New York
Attorney General Spitzer was actively involved in the development of his office’s securitiesrelated cases. Interviewee #38 (discussing Spitzer’s personal role in enforcement actions);
Interviewee #43 (same). To this day, Spitzer is the posterchild for vigorous, headlinegrabbing state securities enforcement. That profile might mask his atypicality as an elected
securities leader, although former Attorneys General Andrew Cuomo and Eric
Schneiderman arguably continued in the role that Spitzer fashioned.
76. Interviewee #53.
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personalities of enforcement chiefs, who are career officials, are the
key driver of enforcement behavior.77
Two former elected leaders were interviewed. Both said that
securities enforcement was not an issue in their election
campaigns.78 After election, one took a hands-off approach to
securities enforcement; the incumbent division head remained on
the job and reported to a deputy, who kept the elected leader
informed on securities matters in addition to other areas under the
leader’s jurisdiction.79 The other former elected leader became more
interested in securities regulation after taking office, including
successfully seeking new enforcement-enhancing legislation.80
Even this leader, however, continued to focus on other areas within
the agency’s jurisdiction.81
These observations suggest an alternative account to one in
which regulators, especially those with elected leaders, engage in
enforcement entrepreneurism. In this account, elected leaders take
a passive role in the early stages of significant cases and become
involved only at a later, public-facing stage. Executive passivity
does not mean, of course, that elected-versus-appointed leadership
does not impact a state’s enforcement activity. Elected leaders
might not push proactively for high-profile investigations. But the
potential political benefits to be gained from them could enable
career staff to pursue those cases more frequently than if they
worked in states whose agency leaders stood to gain little from
high-profile cases.82
These reports distinguish from the literature exploring the
impacts of internal and external politics on SEC enforcement,83
suggesting that state enforcement may be less politicized in the
sense that it is largely insulated from—or even ignored by—
77. See Interviewee #43 (discussing “one example where [a multistate investigation]
was driven by the strength of an investigation and the personality of one regulator”).
78. Interviewee #39; Interviewee #44.
79. Interviewee #39.
80. Interviewee #44.
81. Id.
82. See Andrew K. Jennings, Follow-up Enforcement, 70 DUKE L.J. 1569, 1583 nn.55–56
(2021) (discussing and collecting sources on incentives of career line enforcers).
83. See, e.g., Urska Velikonja, Politics in Securities Enforcement, 50 GA. L. REV. 17, 19
(2015) (“[Although] politics is largely irrelevant at the individual case level, political
influences do shape [the SEC’s] enforcement choices at the aggregate level.”).
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political actors.84 This reduced political influence, coupled with the
long-term staff retention some regulators report enjoying, could
drive more consistent, predictable enforcement behavior, an
advantage to state enforcement and a benefit to in-state securities
firms. Of course, the localized, theft-focused nature of state
enforcement might also explain its relative lack of politicization.
Because they take all comers who make complaints, states largely
lack active discretion over their caseloads. If they had more room
to exercise discretion, then those decisions might become more
politically salient overall. The public harm and moral culpability
associated with a local fraud is also clear: A stole from B in
connection with a securities transaction, a fact that can be proven
by overwhelming evidence. The appropriateness of enforcement
might seem less clear, though, in cases that federal authorities
might pursue in which targets are complex organizations, potential
misconduct is amorphous, and the evidence is open to competing
interpretations. States, in contrast, mostly do not pursue those
harder-call cases but rather conduct more routine policing.
B. Resources
Enforcers noted limited resources as a key constraint on
enforcement, which result in slowing case progress; making
proactive surveillance and larger investigations resource prohibitive;
and limiting investor-education and outreach efforts.85 Those who
84. But see Park, supra note 23, at 157–59 (suggesting that political incentives may
motivate or demotivate elected securities regulators’ enforcement activities).
85. See Interviewee #21 (“I feel like in terms of enforcement, we’re adequately
resourced to respond to complaints that we get. If we had additional resources, we might do
more proactive investigations where we haven’t gotten a complaint.”).
Interviewee #25:
We’re able to handle the cases that come in . . . . Where I think my hands are
somewhat tied are the proactive cases, cases where you don’t know if there’s a
case. Should you invest the time and resources to pursue a case if you’re not sure
one will be there in the end? That weighs on the decision whether to open an
investigation or not.
Interviewee #36:
[W]e’re in a reactive state in our enforcement capacity. There are so many
complaints and investigations to pursue. If we had more resources we could do
more proactive work, going [undercover] to [investment-pitch] seminars, getting
investigative leads, doing more cooperation with federal law enforcement. Now
we have to make a referral, but we can’t maintain any assistance to them. I think
that’s the biggest hindrance, resources.
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expressed satisfaction with their resources tended to work at one of
the few regulators permitted to retain fee revenues, versus relying
on legislative appropriations.86 The best proxy for resources is fulltime-equivalent (FTE) staff, including analysts, investigators,
attorneys, and other professionals.87 Although it might be expected
that the SEC is resource rich compared to its state counterparts, that
is not always the case. In 2018, the SEC’s Division of Enforcement
had 1,385 FTEs, or about one per 236,245 U.S. residents.88 By
comparison, Florida had 113 enforcement FTEs in 2017 (or one per
188,496 Floridians), whereas Michigan had 23 in 2018 (or one per
434,609 Michiganders).89 In 2019, California had 50 FTEs involved in
enforcement activity (or one per 790,000 Californians).90
A number of interviewees cited comparatively low salaries for
their staffs as an obstacle to their enforcement efforts. These
enforcers attrite staff to other in-state agencies, federal agencies, or
industry, and with them, institutional knowledge and investments
in training.91 Other enforcers touted the longevity of their teams as
key strengths. By retaining employees, they are able to apply
formal and informal policies and practices consistently. That point
is important given that state regulators have less accumulated
written guidance and policies compared to the SEC. Professional
judgment and institutional knowledge are thus comparatively

Interviewee #34 (“[D]ue to our size and manpower issues, I think the one area that we fall
down is investor education.”).
86. See, e.g., Interviewee #57 (“We’re a non-appropriated agency, so we don’t have the
pressures of a budget and appropriation process, like some states and the federal agencies
have to deal with.”).
87. Budget records were requested from state securities regulators as part of this
Article’s data-collection process. To the extent that states had budgets specific to securities
regulation—often, budgets were aggregated within a larger parent agency—financial
expenditures for enforcement were not comparable between states. Interviewees used
headcount as a proxy for “resources,” however, because personnel levels are the key limiting
factor on enforcement capacity.
88. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FY 2020 Budget Request by Program, in FISCAL YEAR 2020
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN 21, 24 (2020).
89. See infra Table 6.
90. Letter of Marlou de Luna, Cal. Dep’t of Bus. Oversight, at *1 (July 25, 2019) (on file
with author).
91. See, e.g., Interviewee #23 (“[As far as] personnel, [the] nature of [the state’s]
government in particular is that there is a lot of turnover. The salaries are not good enough
to be able to keep people.”).
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important for effective and consistent enforcement. One enforcer
contrasted the longevity within the regulator with turnover at the
SEC and opined that the regulator’s comparatively high retention
rate allowed it to operate independently, to avoid politicization of
its enforcement mission, and to act consistently in policing the
state’s securities industry.92
C. Priority Setting
No enforcer reported actively setting priorities as an act of
policymaking, as compared to the SEC or DOJ’s ability to choose
types of violations that they are particularly focused on pursuing,
such as insider trading or foreign bribery. State enforcement
activity is overwhelmingly driven by complaints, or to a lesser
extent, the results of routine industry examinations and referrals
from other agencies.
Enforcers expressed an obligation to focus on incoming
complaints and to pursue meritorious cases.93 Interviewees see
themselves as the only line of public defense for many victims of
securities fraud: relatively small thefts that simply will not or
cannot be addressed by the SEC or a U.S. attorney’s office.94 This
point is especially true for state-registered investment advisers
under the $100 million assets-under-management threshold.
Unlike broker-dealers—who are regulated by the SEC, FINRA, and
state regulators—state-registered investment advisers are
exclusively supervised by state regulators.95 Enforcers expressed
heightened awareness around that responsibility because, apart
from the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, there is
no other public oversight when it comes to those firms.

92. See Interviewee #18; Interviewee #40; Interviewee #56; Interviewee #57.
93. Interviewee #29:
[W]e’ve gotten more involved with federal agencies like Homeland Security, the
IRS, the FBI for a long time, and they’ll refer cases to us. But as far as what comes
in, we take all comers. We will take any complaints that come in or tips that we
may get and we will investigate.
94. See supra notes 39–40.
95. See, e.g., Interviewee #2 (“We’re the only resource and recourse for everything
from suitability to excessive fees, to generally the fiduciary standard that applies to
investment advisers. We are the only regulatory authority for these [state-registered]
investment advisers, so that’s a pretty big responsibility and a big focus of our division.”).
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Agenda setting by incoming complaints, referrals, and
examinations does not mean that state regulators follow a first-infirst-out approach. Matters are investigated and resourced on a
priority basis: ongoing misconduct takes priority over completed
misconduct, misconduct against elderly and vulnerable people
over younger and less vulnerable people, and matters with
cooperative victims over uncooperative victims.96 Indeed, some
victims react with denial, believing that their investments are
legitimate and that it is the regulator’s interference that creates the
risk of loss; fraudulent promoters sometimes scapegoat the
investigation itself as the cause for losses.97 Enforcers sometimes
redirect resources from investigations with uncooperative victims
to ones with cooperative victims, which reflects the tight resources
many regulators face. For instance, interviewees touted their ability
to use cease-and-desist orders to stop ongoing frauds more quickly
than the SEC can.98 Investigations of prior, nonrecurring
misconduct may take longer, however. That point was echoed by
private attorneys who expressed frustration that long
investigations prevent claimants from making collateral use of
enforcement actions and sometimes prejudice claims by
telegraphing to adjudicators that the regulator does not consider
the claims to be urgent.99

96. See, e.g., Interviewee #8:
Do we have an ongoing fraud, and if we have an ongoing fraud, what is the
number of victims and the dollar amount of victim loss? We may receive a
complaint about a historical fraud with 10 victims that is no longer ongoing,
whereas a complaint with ongoing fraud, like an affinity fraud with [hundreds] of
investors, is going to take priority. It’s a triage system.
97. See, e.g., Interviewee #69:
It’s kind of frustrating . . . a lot of times these investors have no idea their money
is gone. We’re the ones who basically have to tell them this. The people we’re going
after, they tell these people that if it weren’t for the [securities regulator], you’d
have your money.
98. See Interviewee #31 (“[I]’ve found that we can use administrative authority very
effectively to stop ongoing fraud. We have authority to issue ex parte emergency C&Ds.
Violation of an emergency C&D order is punishable as a [crime].”).
99. See, e.g., Interviewee #13:
We want to help the regulators, but we don’t want to do so if it’s going to hurt the
client’s case. That bleeds over to the states as well. You can alert the states, but if
they don’t take action or give a slap on the wrist for whatever reason, it looks bad
for the customer’s case.
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States break with no-priorities all-comers practice, however,
when it comes to protecting elderly investors. They see these
investors as particularly vulnerable and, because they often have
substantial assets, as attractive targets.100 This belief is reflected in
states’ enforcement activity: in 2018, of the 1,786 actions they
brought, 758, or 42%, involved elderly victims.101 To address this
concern, states have embraced the protection of senior citizens as a
national priority. NASAA, for example, has issued a vulnerableadults financial-exploitation model act, and 27 states and FINRA
have adopted it to some degree.102 The act mandates broker-dealers
and investment advisers to report suspected financial exploitation
of covered individuals to adult protective services or a state
securities regulator.103 NASAA has begun separately collecting
data on senior-related enforcement activity, reporting that in 2018
state regulators received 410 complaints or tips, conducted 365
investigations, and took 141 enforcement actions related to 758
elderly victims.104
This example of national priority setting, however, both
exemplifies the states’ ability to identify and adapt to emerging risks
in the capital markets and hints at the risks of doing so. Several
interviewees viewed reports made under their new financialexploitation acts as stressing existing resources.105 Although
financial-exploitation statutes represent an opportunity to detect,
and even thwart, fraud, if states are unable to add resources needed
to act on incoming information, it could have the pernicious effect of
reducing capacity to investigate and pursue cases by imposing too
Interviewee #14 (“Whenever you have a written record of the customer’s response and the
customer is unsophisticated and doesn’t understand the nuances, they say things that screw
them up.”).
100. See, e.g., Interviewee #20 (“[I]n terms of priorities, the one we would have is a case
involving seniors. . . . We prioritize that because [this state] is an older state and because
elderly victims [are] vulnerable, susceptible to fraud. They also need the money to live.”);
Interviewee #23 (“[I]n every administration the interest is going to be trying to prevent fraud
and theft by other names, especially with respect to senior citizens.).
101. See N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, NASAA 2019 ENFORCEMENT REPORT 4, 8 (2019).
102. Id. at 8.
103. NASAA MODEL LEGISLATION OR REGULATION TO PROTECT VULNERABLE ADULTS
FROM FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION (2016).
104. N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, supra note 101, at 9.
105. See, e.g., Interviewee #47 (discussing a high volume of senior-exploitation reports
from investment advisers and broker-dealers and explaining that the division is “trying to
understand how to handle, how to process them”).
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much new demand on already stretched resources. An advantage of
the states’ all-comers approach is avoiding the potential tunnel
vision that the SEC and other agencies with enforcement discretion
might be criticized for. The structural and resource constraints that
lead state regulators to function on a largely all-comers basis limits
proactive policing but advantages spotting new trends. Without
adding compensating resources, however, prioritizing types of
victims or misconduct risks undermining that advantage while
exacerbating overall resource constraints.
D. Fraud Prevalence and Public Salience
There is a limited literature on the prevalence of securities fraud.
Interviewees agreed that they fail to detect much, or most, of that
conduct in their jurisdictions, although they did not know how much
misconduct they spot versus what goes unseen.106 Whatever the
frequency of securities misconduct, improving detection depends
partly on raising the awareness of the public, as well as actors in the
securities industry; law enforcement; and adult protective services to
the existence and characteristics of that misconduct.107 This task is
challenged by victims who are ashamed, embarrassed, or in denial
about what they have experienced, making them less likely to

106. Cf. Interviewee #13 (observing that around 4,000 customer disputes are filed in
FINRA arbitration annually and suggesting that “[w]ith the number of broker-dealers and
representatives out there, it’s very hard to believe there are only 4,000 times that someone
has misrepresented an investment”); Interviewee #72 (“I would guess we see less than 10%
of potential wrongdoing that’s our bread and butter. I’m sure there’s a lot going on out there
that we don’t know about.”). When Interviewee #24 was asked for a sense of fraud
underreporting in the state, the enforcer replied:
[I]t would seem to me that we should be receiving more complaints than we do. . . .
We’ve [adopted policies like the Model Senior Act and] we think that’ll generate
some information for us. The problem is people are so embarrassed. . . . I think a
lot of people don’t realize who they could complain to. Who do they call first?
Most of the time, they might not even know there’s an issue. They build up these
trust relationships with sales representatives or investment advisers. . . . It’s not
until something happens that they complain.
107. See Interviewee #19 (“[B]ecause of our awareness in the community—we talk to
over 8,000 people—we get various calls, not a large number, but a lot of them turn into actual
cases because we were out there teaching people . . . .”); Interviewee #29 (“The public is our
first line of defense.”); Interviewee #72 (“Even if we had more resources, it’s not clear to me
that without people reaching out that we’d be able to find [cases].”).
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complain or to cooperate.108 Enforcers also pointed to economic
growth over the last decade prior to the recession sparked by the
COVID-19 pandemic as reducing fraud complaints.109 In good times,
frauds like Ponzi schemes might appear successful until economic
conditions cause them to collapse, and during those good times
investors are less likely to closely monitor their investments.110 In a
recession, however, this misconduct becomes evident, spiking
complaint volumes. Shortly after interviews for this Article were
completed, the country entered the COVID-19 period; its full impact
on complaints remains to be seen.111
Actions generally originate from investor complaints or
referrals from agencies to whom investors have complained, like
local police.112 Detecting violations is in turn partly a function of
how aware the public and local law enforcement are of what
investment-related fraud is and what it looks like, and the
availability of a state regulator that can investigate and take action.
Similarly, investors who have substantive knowledge to identify
fraud, or who know that they can contact their state regulator as a
due-diligence step, can reduce the risk that they are harmed.113
Enforcers see a connection between detection and prevention
on the one hand, and public and law-enforcement awareness on the
other.114 Some interviewees touted their public and law-

108. See Email from Interviewee #1 (on file with author) (“One barrier we see is that
some victims are embarrassed when they are scammed and are not willing to come forward.
Another barrier is when victims are part of an affinity-fraud scheme.”).
109. See, e.g., Interviewee #36 (“I worry how we’ll be poised to respond in a time of
economic downturn. I’m thinking about how we might be flooded with complaints and
having to prioritize or turn away . . . .”); cf. Jill Gross, The Improbable Birth and Conceivable
Death of the Securities Arbitration Clinic, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 597 (2014) (discussing
the countercyclical nature of private securities claims and macroeconomic conditions).
110. See, e.g., Interviewee #36 (noting that economic downturns expose Ponzi schemes).
111. See, e.g., id.; see also NASAA Forms COVID-19 Enforcement Task Force, N. AM. SEC.
ADM’RS ASS’N (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.nasaa.org/54844/nasaa-forms-covid-19enforcement-task-force/ (announcing the formation of a task force to proactively surveille
for COVID-19-related frauds).
112. See, e.g., Interviewee #50 (“The bulk of cases come from complaints. We get
referrals from public agencies too.”).
113. See Interviewee #19 (“[W]e were out there teaching people that they should call us
before they invest to see if the person’s registered and the product is registered. We’ve taught
people to identify fraud and report it.”).
114. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.

95

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:1 (2021)

enforcement outreach and education efforts,115 while others
acknowledged that staffing levels limit their outreach and
education efforts.116 These efforts, interviewees explained, serve
two main purposes. First, they give investors substantive
information, like how to spot potential offering fraud or how to
diligence a financial adviser, that, they hope, will steer investors
away from outright frauds.117 Second, they increase the awareness
among investors and local law enforcement that issues involving
securities are not merely contractual matters.118 If local law
enforcement unintentionally misleads a complaining investor into
believing that a potential securities violation is a private contractual
dispute, that investor might miss out on obtaining public redress,
like restitution. The enforcer will also lose an opportunity to
identify other victims or to stop an imminent or ongoing fraud.119
Most divisions post information online about enforcement
actions.120 In some instances, press releases assist in ongoing
investigations. For example, if an enforcer announces an
emergency order against a Ponzi schemer, investors in the scheme
115. The most commonly cited examples of public education included presentations to
elders and to civic groups. Law enforcement outreach includes presentations to policeleadership conferences, as well as to new-recruit academies. But see Lauren E. Willis, Against
Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197 (2008) (questioning the effectiveness of
financial-literacy education—including investor education—and noting the lack of empirical
support for it). See Interviewee #37:
[W]e also do outreach to prosecutors and law enforcement. In many instances these
people are on the initial intake. We tell them it’s not “civil.” Many of them aren’t
aware that we have really good criminal authority, so we educate them so that when
they’re taking the intake they know to reach us and not to dismiss it as civil . . . .
116. See Interviewee #24 (“[W]e don’t have a program in [this state] and it would enable
us to be out on the road and put on seminars at senior-citizen centers, tell people how to
protect themselves. But I don’t have the staff.”).
117. See supra note 113.
118. See supra note 115; see also Interviewee #4 (“[In this state we had a local prosecutor.]
He had a case come across his desk and looks at it: a bad actor who has no money, looks like
a civil matter. We worked with him on it and it opened his eyes . . . . We ultimately put
someone in prison for life for what they did to seventeen victims.”).
119. Interviewees offered anecdotal cases of public education having positive direct
impacts on investors. Some enforcers also keep statistics on the number of people they reach.
They lack, however, metrics that would allow them to estimate the overall effect of these
efforts on preventing securities violations, raising the salience of their role among the public
and law enforcement, or increasing the detection of violations.
120. See Interviewee #37 (discussing posting enforcement orders and press releases
online as a recidivism-prevention method).
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might realize for the first time that they are victims and come
forward with useful information.121 Online publication also has a
prophylactic effect: investors doing even modest diligence about
private offerings, broker-dealers, or investment advisers will search
online. If those searches return relevant enforcement records,
prospective investors might decide it is too risky to deal with a
potential recidivist.122 One enforcer in a state with a well-developed
restitution fund remarked that the fund’s presence does encourage
some victims to come forward, because although the principal is
gone, having some recovery opportunity from a public fund is
enough to overcome the embarrassment of coming forward.123
Despite efforts at raising public and law enforcement
awareness, however, interviewees reported having no data on the
direct effects of these efforts at allowing members of the public to
spot investment-related fraud or increasing the likelihood that
frauds come to regulators’ attention. For example, in the 2017 fiscal
year, the Utah Securities Division “presented 68 investor seminars
to 14,096 attendees to protect Utahns from fraud.”124 There is no
telling, though, what effect those seminars had on the attendees or
others, a worrisome question across regulators’ outreach programs.
Generating attribution data would allow regulators to improve the
targeting and content of their outreach programs, as well as to
demonstrate their value within the securities-enforcement system.
Getting these impact data might require surveys or other
marketing-attribution methods to quantify effects of education
efforts. For this Article, however, the question “where do people
turn when they have been victims of securities fraud” can be partly
answered. In a survey delivered via Amazon’s MTurk platform,
respondents were asked what organizations they would
recommend an investment-fraud victim to turn to, or that they
121. See, e.g., Interviewee #18 (“Once an indictment is handed down, we’ll do a press
release to identify other potential victims.”).
122. One enforcer reported hearing from potential investors who found orders online
against promoters of opportunities that they were considering investing in. Interviewee #32
(“We get a lot of calls that ‘I found your order against so and so and he just solicited me to
buy such and such.’”). Cf. Barnard, supra note 18, at 25 (proposing that NASAA, the SEC, and
other agencies form a registry of securities offenders to facilitate investor due diligence and
monitoring for recidivism).
123. See Interviewee #4 (expressing pride in the outcomes of the state’s securitiesrestitution fund).
124. UTAH DEP’T OF COM., 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2017).
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themselves would turn to.125 Respondents were given sixteen
randomized multi-select options of local, state, federal, and nongovernmental agencies. Of 419 respondents, about a fourth, 112,
reported that they would not recommend any of the options to a
fraud victim, or pursue any themselves.126 The most common
recommendation was to contact a private attorney (40.10%),
followed by the Better Business Bureau (23.87%) and the SEC
(19.57%); “the local police department” came in sixth at 16.95% and
“the state securities regulator” came seventh at 15.99%.127 The
SEC’s top-three ranking came even as respondents were given the
option of contacting a state securities regulator, suggesting that
federal securities regulation in general, or the SEC as an institution,
enjoys higher public salience than state regulation or regulators.
This result is consistent with a point made by one enforcer that
complainants sometimes believe that they are talking to the SEC
and refer to the state regulator as the “SEC.”128
Although state regulators were not the highest-salience resource,
state and local agencies were collectively looked to more than federal
authorities: there were 323 responses for state and local agencies
versus 223 for the SEC, FINRA, the FBI, and U.S. attorneys’ offices.129
On the state level, “local police” received seventy-one responses
versus forty for “state police,” and “local prosecutor’s office”
received sixty-one responses versus forty-seven for “state attorney
general.”130 These data suggest that although the SEC may be more
salient than its state counterparts, on the whole victims are more
likely to go to state and local agencies. This point supports that
raising awareness among state and local agencies matters for
securities policing: they will often be the first stop for complaints,
which they can channel to the regulator if they know to do so.
The survey data suggest that the most common stops, however,
are private attorneys (40.10% of respondents). Although some
125. For a full explanation of the survey and this question, see infra APPENDIX, Table 12.
126. Infra APPENDIX, Table 12.
127. Infra APPENDIX, Table 12.
128. Interviewee #50; see also Interviewee #17 (“I don’t think most people know who
we were, what the securities division did, even in the [securities] industry.”).
129. Infra APPENDIX, Table 12.
130. Infra APPENDIX, Table 12. “Federal prosecutor’s office” was close behind “state
attorney general” at thirty-five responses. Infra APPENDIX, Table 12.
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interviewees discussed their outreach efforts with the practicing
bar, private attorneys were largely absent players in discussions
about such efforts.131 Private attorneys, however, have the potential
to be important on-the-ground channels of investor complaints to
regulators. States that develop these relationships—such as
through targeting communications at or organizing advisory
committees of investor advocates and securities practitioners—
stand to enhance detection.
In all, the data suggest that when victims report experiencing
securities fraud, they are most likely to turn to state—particularly
local—authorities for help. This observation in turn points to a state
advantage in policing local frauds because there are private
attorneys, prosecutors, police departments, and adult protective
services in most communities. Combining these actors’ distributed
reach with state regulators’ technical expertise can foster an
efficient and effective intrastate securities-enforcement system. In
comparison, given the geographic dispersion of local securities
violations, it would be impracticable for federal authorities to build
comparable networks that give them presence in every community.
E. Legislation, Policy, and Autonomy
Securities regulators have among the deepest stores of
securities-law expertise in many states, as well as broad insight
into their capital markets and, through coordination with other
states, national trends.132 These factors allow enforcers to inform
policy. Cryptocurrency and digital tokens offer a good example of
state enforcers’ ability to inform and drive policy development.
As the regulation of digital currency has continued to vex the SEC,
CFTC, and Internal Revenue Service, a number of states have
taken action to confront fraud in connection with cryptocurrency
and digital tokens.133 One interviewee recounted the regulator’s
role in the enactment of the state’s digital-tokens statute. That
131. One interviewee at a regulator with a well-resourced outreach program did
mention that the regulator does regular trainings for bar associations. Interviewee #19.
132. In some states, this expertise may not be readily available to legislators from
members of the practicing bar or legal academy. One interviewee, for example, noted that
there was only one known practicing securities lawyer in the state. Interviewee #47.
133. See, e.g., Alabama Securities Commission Updates Coordinated Crypto Crackdown, ALA.
SEC. COMM’N
(Aug. 7, 2019), asc.alabama.gov/News/2019%20News/8-7-19%
20Coordinated-crypto-background-NASAA-Revised.pdf.
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effort included shepherding the bill through multiple legislative
sessions and, in the process, using its expertise to shift the bill
from excluding digital tokens to adopting a functional approach
to securities classification. 134 One former elected agency leader—
who might be expected, as an elected official, to have engaged
more freely with legislators than career enforcers—recounted
seeking and obtaining statutory enhancements to the regulator’s
securities-enforcement authority.135
Interviewees reported that their enforcement work goes mostly
untouched by external politics. Even within states whose leaders
are less favorable to economic regulation, the need to prevent and
act against fraud is largely uncontroversial.136 One interviewee
framed the bipartisan appeal of securities enforcement: “[F]or
Republicans, I talked about law enforcement and for Democrats,
I talked about consumer protection.”137 Another enforcer saw
administration transitions as having no impact on the regulator’s
work: “I’ve worked under Democratic and Republican [agency
leaders]. On the securities side, there’s zero political influence.”138
Another enforcer at a regulator with low turnover remarked that
the longevity of the staff bolsters the regulator’s independence.139
Enforcers also point to the need for uniformity between states
as serving incidentally as a bulwark for their independence.140 Most
states, for instance, follow either the 1956 or 2002 Uniform
Securities Act.141 These acts’ anchoring effects have given some
enforcers laws that better empower enforcement than would be
expected if their legislatures wrote bespoke statutes.142 Thus, by
coordinating formally and informally, including through NASAA,
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Interviewee #1.
Interviewee #44.
See supra note 73.
Interviewee #45.
Interviewee #32.
Interviewee #57.
Interviewee #42; Interviewee #50.
See U.S. Survey: State Adoption of Uniform Securities Act, NAT’L ASS’N FOR FIXED
ANNUITIES (Oct. 12, 2012), nafa.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/20120920-NAFAUniform-Security-Act-Adoption_At-A-Glance.pdf.
142. Interviewee #42 (“I am glad we have the Uniform Securities Act because (in
my opinion) it provides us with broader authority than that statutorily given to our
sister divisions.”).
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state enforcers act collectively to set policy that political actors
might acquiesce to for uniformity’s sake.143
Nevertheless, political influence on securities enforcement
remains an incomplete picture. Most interviewees were either
current enforcers, or former enforcers who practice law adjacent
to their former employers. In those roles, they may have been less
than unvarnished in discussing this sensitive question. One
former enforcer cautioned that over time an enforcer will
accumulate enemies, perhaps including those who have sway
with political officials.144 Although securities regulators’ expertise
may give them influence with political officials, a countervailing
effect is the relative ease for politically influential actors to capture
state elected officials.145
III. WHAT DO STATE SECURITIES ENFORCERS DO?
This Part frames state securities enforcement as a system in
which each state enforcer sits as a hub in a two-way horizontal
and vertical enforcement network of state securities regulators,
federal agencies, in-state agencies, local and state law enforcement
and prosecutors, and private actors. 146 The network’s structure,
with state securities regulators as hubs, can be seen in the
following figure:

143. See Interviewee #50 (“[E]specially on the enforcement side, fraud’s fraud. We
have a new administration in now; they’ve been very supportive of that work. Plus with
the Uniform Act, most of the states are doing the same thing, so that helps with
consistency too.”).
144. Id. This interviewee described complaints to a new gubernatorial administration
that the securities regulator was “unfriendly” to business, particularly that it did not issue
broker-dealer licenses to applicants who received them in other states. To counter this
complaint, the interviewee conducted an internal study showing that the regulator approved
98% of license applications within twenty-four hours, another 0.5% within two days, and
that only 0.5% of applicants had special conditions imposed on their licenses or were asked
to withdraw. Id.
145. Id. In one instance, an in-state public company lobbied during the legislature’s
regular session for a restriction on trading in its shares; the head of the securities regulator
counseled the governor that the proposal was federally preempted. The restriction was
later quietly enacted during a special session, which the regulator’s head learned about
the next day. Id.
146. See Verity Winship, Enforcement Networks, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 274 (2020), for a
conceptual explanation of enforcement networks and an empirical study of vertical and
horizontal incoming referrals to the SEC (including from state securities regulators).
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In this network, state enforcers are horizontally and vertically
situated to detect securities offenses and either to take action
directly or channel them to more efficient actors. Beyond serving as
detection hubs, state enforcers’ institutional positions, expertise,
and broad enforcement jurisdiction allow them to serve as residual
enforcers in a national securities-enforcement system. Local police
or prosecutors, for instance, might enjoy criminal jurisdiction over
securities misconduct but lack the expertise or resources to pursue
such cases. Thus, they refer complainants to the regulator. A
regional SEC office might have expertise to pursue that very same
misconduct but lack resources to police small-dollar frauds in
addition to doing resource-intense investigations. It would thus
refer the matter to the complainant’s state regulator. In this light,
state securities enforcers have been largely missing from the
literature’s efforts to theorize and understand American securities
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enforcement. This Part expands that understanding by explaining
what state regulators do and how they do it.
A. Investigation Sourcing
States source investigations from four places: complaints and tips;
referrals from other agencies; audits and examinations; and selfsourcing. Of these four, complaints are the most important source.147
Complaints come mostly from aggrieved investors, who might
contact regulators via online forms, phone, or even walk-in visits.148
Some come from members of the securities industry or the public. This
point is borne out in a sample of seven states’ enforcement data.149
These states together received 903 complaints or tips for recent oneyear periods.150 By comparison, during that time they received less
than a tenth that number of referrals from the SEC, 56 of which were
to one state (Florida) with a large population of retirees.151 The same
group reported receiving 21 referrals from FINRA; 29 referrals from
state and local law enforcement and prosecutors; 19 from other instate agencies, like insurance or banking regulators; and 7 from sister
state securities regulators.152
These sample counts likely mask, however, the part in-state
actors play in channeling investor complaints to their securities
regulators. Local police departments and prosecutors, as well as
adult protective services, are important indirect sources of referrals.
When aggrieved investors speak to local police, police might refer
them to the regulator.153 This observation is consistent with the Part
147. See KURT EICHENWALD, SERPENT ON THE ROCK 355 (1995) (recounting the Idaho
securities commissioner’s practice of staying late at the office for drop-in investor complaints).
148. Private attorneys reported sometimes being the source of complaints, consistent
with the Section II.D.2 study finding that private attorneys are by far the most salient
resource for aggrieved investors. See infra APPENDIX, Table 12. These attorneys expressed
uncertainty around submitting complaints, though, and described three concerns that lead
them not to report: (1) decisions not to charge or to bring minor charges indirectly cast
aspersions on the merits of clients’ claims in FINRA arbitration, (2) delay in investigations
can have similar prejudicial effects, (3) and regulator interviews with uncounseled victims
or witnesses can lead to unwitting statements that needlessly prejudice private claims. See
supra note 98.
149. See infra APPENDIX, Table 8 (Delaware, Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, and Wisconsin).
150. Infra APPENDIX, Table 8.
151. Infra APPENDIX, Table 8.
152. Infra APPENDIX, Table 8.
153. See Interviewee #71:

103

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:1 (2021)

II.D.2 salience study: even when respondents are given an option
of reporting to a state securities regulator, local police still had a
slight edge as reporting channel.154 The importance of local
agencies as on-the-ground referrers explains regulators’ efforts to
educate local law enforcement and adult protective services.
Several enforcers expressed concern that without proper training
for identifying potential securities cases, local police deem those
complaints to be “civil” issues.155 They thus unintentionally
mislead complainants into believing that their only recourse is civil
litigation. When that happens, a case that might merit public
enforcement never reaches the regulator. Such a failure is not
necessarily isolated to one victim: a single complaint referred to a
regulator could help uncover dozens more victims.
Beyond referrals (direct or indirect) from in-state agencies, state
enforcers receive referrals from federal counterparts, particularly
the SEC. Current and former enforcers identified most of these
referrals as relating to intrastate conduct falling under a monetary
threshold that would motivate the SEC or a U.S. attorney’s office to
keep the case.156 No interviewee gave a confident estimate what
that “threshold” is; one rule of thumb is that federal authorities
might be interested in cases involving a million dollars or more.157
There are glimmers of this threshold in the Dodd-Frank Act’s
whistleblower provisions, which deal with cases whose monetary
sanctions exceed a million dollars.158

Local law enforcement tends not to investigate securities fraud cases; they don’t
have the capacity to do that. But there is a state agency, the regulatory agency for
securities . . . they have a number of lawyers who investigate and analyze
securities cases. If complaints come in from the public, [local law enforcement]
would contact the securities division.
154. See infra APPENDIX, Table 12.
155. See Interviewee #50:
[W]e work with the police training academy, share information with them to teach
recruits that they should be contacting us. But we also work joint cases with police
departments around the state. We’ve seen the “that’s civil” problem in the past,
but we’ve taken steps to try to address it.
156. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
157. Interviewee #20 (“[I]f a case is of significance, $1,000,000 of victim losses, then
that’s a threshold that the U.S. attorney’s office might be interested in.”).
158. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(a)(1).
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In the previously mentioned seven-state sample,159 the SEC
referred eight times as many cases to the states (seventy-two) as
they referred to the SEC (nine).160 This difference suggests that
aggrieved investors submit complaints to the SEC because it is the
nation’s highest-profile securities regulator, and that it often
determines complaints would be more appropriately handled by a
state regulator.161 That referral mechanism is consistent with the
Part II.D.2 salience study’s finding that the SEC is the securities
agency that the public is most likely to turn to.162 Other
interviewees mentioned receiving federal referrals due to
geography (e.g., the state regulator was geographically closer to the
relevant individuals and records than the SEC regional office) or
internal dynamics (e.g., SEC leadership was uninterested in or
outright opposed to bringing a case).163 One mentioned receiving
reports from financial-industry whistleblowers who went to the
state regulator because they did not trust the SEC to investigate.164
On the other side of that referral network, referral from states to

159. See infra APPENDIX, Table 8.
160. Verity Winship’s study of acknowledgments in SEC enforcement releases from
1998 to 2018 found that, among acknowledged state and local entities, the top three were the
Texas State Securities Board, New York Attorney General, and Massachusetts Secretary of
the Commonwealth. See Winship, supra note 146, at 306. These securities regulators
accounted for twenty percent (165/824) of acknowledgments of state and local entities. Id.
Although some of those acknowledgments might not reflect those regulators’ referrals to the
SEC, many likely do. Id.
161. See ENF’T DIV., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 94 (2017):
Congress created a dual securities regulatory system in which both federal and
state agencies serve specific, valuable functions in protecting investors. . . .
Assigned staff should discuss with their supervisors whether it may be
appropriate to refer a matter or certain conduct to the state informally. For
example, a state may have a particular interest in a case or type of case, the victims
or parties may be concentrated in a particular geographic location, the conduct
may be limited, though significant, or there may be no federal jurisdiction.
162. See infra APPENDIX, Table 12.
163. See Interviewee #4 (“The SEC refers matters to us. No one wants to come to [our state]:
[the weather is too extreme].”); Email from Interviewee #56 (on file with author) (describing
internal conflicts within the SEC that led to cases being referred to the state regulator).
164. Interviewee #38 (“We had whistleblowers come to us and told us they’re not going
to SEC because they assume the SEC will sit on it. They’re not going to FINRA for the same
reasons. So often whistleblowers make or break the entire area.”). There is precedent for
states opening cases based on whistleblower reports after the SEC did not act upon those
reports. See Jones, supra note 6, at 120 (recounting a whistleblower going to the Massachusetts
secretary of the commonwealth after the SEC’s Boston regional office failed to act on the
whistleblower’s report).
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federal authorities—whether to the SEC or a U.S. attorney’s office—
is frequently driven by whether a case has significant interstate
components. Federal authorities have advantages in such cases in
terms of obtaining evidence.165
Although enforcers reported that most of their enforcement
work comes from complaints—a point supported by the data in
Table 8—they also detect issues through their examinations of
broker-dealer branches and state-registered investment advisers.166
Florida, for example, has a reputation for a robust examination
program. In 2017, it brought 105 enforcement actions for
books-and-records violations—all involving broker-dealers or
investment advisers—whereas it brought 69 actions involving
unlicensed firms or individuals.167 This role for examinations
reveals an interplay between their prophylactic and enforcement
functions: they ensure and promote compliance while also
detecting enforcement issues.
For many enforcers, investigative capacity is largely limited to
handling incoming complaints. 168 Others, though, have capacity
to generate cases through proactive surveillance and similar
efforts. On the broker-dealer front, proactive surveillants reported
monitoring FINRA’s Central Registration Depository (CRD) for
arbitral and enforcement actions involving broker-dealer
licensees in their states.169 Investigations or enforcement by
FINRA, or private claims by brokerage customers, might lead
state regulators to look into the underlying alleged conduct for
state-licensing purposes. No interviewee reported proactively

165. See Interviewee #32 (“[H]ow much activity occurred out of state[;] that would give
the feds an advantage in trying to get the evidence you’d need . . . .”).
166. See Interviewee #60 (discussing examination procedures and observing that
enforcement actions often result from the regulator’s examinations).
167. See infra APPENDIX, Table 9.
168. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., Interviewee #24 (“One of the other ways [we monitor] is we kind of troll
in the CRD system, where complaints have to be recorded. Just because some complaints are
filed with the firm or FINRA, that doesn’t prevent us to investigate ourselves to see if we
need to take actions.”). FINRA enforcement actions may, of course, have bases that motivate
state enforcers less than pure investor-protection-type violations would. See James Fallows
Tierney, The Political Economy of Securities Industry Bars (Mar. 8, 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=1349730 (work in progress)
(offering a political-economy theory for enforcement by FINRA in its capacity as an SRO).
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monitoring non-FINRA litigation data for leads. For instance,
although the SEC reviews private securities litigation for
enforcement leads, no state enforcer reported doing so.170 The SEC
also develops enforcement cases by reviewing regulatory
filings;171 in contrast, interviewees expressed concern that
promoters of NSMIA-covered offerings routinely flout state
notice-filing obligations that NSMIA preserves, thus limiting
regulators’ surveillance over their capital markets. 172 Among
states that have capacity to do proactive surveillance, a common
approach is monitoring investment opportunities being
advertised to the public, particularly online. 173 A few states even
do undercover work.174 Like the SEC, states sometimes find leads
in newspapers.175
These practices around case sourcing mean that state
regulators have less ability to set priorities than their federal
counterparts do, with investigations being largely driven by a
flow of investor complaints. Indeed, interviewees felt duty-bound
to tackle complaints. This “all comers” approach has a secondary
benefit, however, in forcing states to spot emerging issues. For
170. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
171. See Alexander I. Platt, “Gatekeeping” in the Dark: SEC Control Over Private Securities
Litigation Revisited, 72 ADMIN. L. REV. 27, 55–56 (2020) (discussing the policing role of the
SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance, which reviews and comments on securities filings
and can refer matters to the agency’s Division of Enforcement).
172. Cf. Interviewee #4 (expressing concern over lack of surveillance over Regulation
D offerings); Interviewee #42 (“[I]t seems like the biggest and most serious offenders that we
see are usually not registered in any capacity. It’s usually some sort of private offering. The
offering is usually not registered. They often will say, ‘oh it’s a Reg D 506,’ but they never
filed with anybody.”); Interviewee #61 (noting that registration staff sometimes identify
potential enforcement cases).
173. See Interviewee #31 (describing online investigative techniques). But see
Interviewee #48 (“We are not on the [method omitted] surveillance train. I hope if we have
this conversation in a year to be able to tell you that we are.”).
174. Interviewee #31 (“I’m aware that some other states do [undercover investigations],
but I don’t believe that many. More and more are doing it. In most cases [whether to do them
is] simply a matter of policy.”).
175. Compare Interviewee #57 (“We may see things in the newspaper that would cause
us to open a file.”), with Letter from Daniel Greenspan, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Div. of
Corp. Fin., to John D. Sheehan, CFO, Mylan N.V. (July 22, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001623613/000000000015038019/filename1.
pdf (requesting information about a land transaction first reported in the Wall Street
Journal), and Mylan N.V., Form 10-K (Feb. 15, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/0001623613/000162361316000046/myl10k_20151231xdoc.htm#s419EE0149294
5D02B28F0DDDB1384707 (disclosing an SEC investigation into the transaction).
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instance, if there is a sudden rise in complaints involving
cryptocurrency, regulators must confront it. If sister states see the
same problem in their own complaints, that suggests a national
problem that they can coordinate to tackle on enforcement,
legislative, and other fronts.
B. Investigations and Enforcement Actions
States’ investigative processes are driven by case-specific
factors, making a “typical” investigation elusive to outline.
Numerous enforcers, for instance, reported not having an
enforcement manual, as the SEC and some states, like Texas and
Florida, do, meaning that they take a case-by-case approach.176
The general contours of state securities investigations and
enforcement can be sketched out, though. Investigations tend to
involve alleged misconduct with one or more discrete victims.
After intake, investigations follow four stages: vetting, informal
investigation, formal investigation, and charging. In general,
interviewees could not estimate typical timelines—from the initial
opening of a file to resolution—but they did suggest a broad range
of a month to up to years.177
In the vetting stage, cases are either assigned directly to an
investigator—who typically is not an attorney178—or are triaged by
the regulator’s enforcement chief.179 The investigator or
enforcement chief reviews the complaint, referral, or tip for
whether it facially relates to a violation of the state’s securities
statute or raises some promise of identifying one.180 A case that
176. Cf. Interviewee #64 (explaining that although the regulator has access to an
enforcement manual provided by NASAA, practices and procedures are taught informally
by the division’s leader to new and junior personnel).
177. See Interviewee #29 (explaining that investigations “can take anywhere from a
matter of weeks to months and years” depending on factors including the number of victims
and the level of document review required).
178. Investigators are sometimes sworn law-enforcement officers with power to arrest,
carry firearms, and obtain and execute search warrants.
179. TEX. STATE SEC. BD., POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL FOR THE ENFORCEMENT
DIVISION OF THE TEXAS STATE SECURITIES BOARD ¶ 48 (2018) (setting procedures for opening
an investigation, including review and approval by the enforcement chief) [hereinafter
TEXAS ENFORCEMENT MANUAL]; see also Interviewee #29 (describing an informal procedure
in which a supervisor reviews complaints and assigns them to investigators).
180. See TEXAS ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 179.
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does not pass this vetting might be referred out to a responsible
agency; a dispute over insurance products, for instance, would be
sent to the insurance regulator.181 Matters that merit further
factfinding become investigations. States are mixed in whether
opening an investigation requires an investigator to obtain
approval from leadership, with larger offices likely to have more
formal processes for obtaining such approvals.182
In the informal-investigation stage, an investigator first takes
steps that do not require the issuance of subpoenas. These steps
include interviewing complainants or other potential victims (and,
sometimes, potential targets);183 making (mandatory) information
and document requests to registered persons or (voluntary)
requests to potential targets;184 and conducting research like
reviewing public solicitations or materials found through internet
or law-enforcement-database searches or as entries in CRD.185 This
stage might include informal inquiries to and sharing of
information with fellow regulators.186 A small number of states also
conduct undercover investigations, a technique that the SEC does

181. See, e.g., Interviewee #53 (“We’ll get [calls] from the public . . . complaining about
time shares. . . . We don’t do timeshares or banking. Insurance we get a lot of calls about: we
refer them to [the state insurance regulator].”).
182. See, e.g., TEXAS ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 179.
183. See Interviewee #17 (discussing these steps); Interviewee #34 (same).
184. Under the Uniform Securities Act, broker-dealers and investment advisers must
produce documents and submit to examination when requested to do so by a state securities
regulator. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 411 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L., amended
2005) (recordkeeping and production requirements for securities licensees); see also
Interviewee #16 (“If we have less time to [issue a subpoena], we may send a letter requesting
voluntary disclosure, and sometimes entities will cooperate, but generally after doing some
homework and thinking there’s some ‘there’ there.”); Interviewee #25 (“We’ll send out a
subpoena tomorrow if they’re not registered. If they are, we send out an information request
because they have to respond.”).
185. See supra notes 169, 173 and accompanying text.
186. See Interviewee #23 (“[B]ecause regulators know regulators invest in certain
issues, if an entity is in one state but we’re seeing bad acts related to our state, we might
reach out . . . and see if they’d issue some [requests for information] or join up in the
investigation itself.”).
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not itself use187 but that is well suited to gathering evidence of
street-level securities violations.188
The use of subpoenas or search warrants to obtain records and
testimony marks the formal-investigation stage. Investigations skip
this stage when enforcers collect all needed documents and witness
accounts through informal investigative methods. For example, a
subpoena might not be needed to obtain records from a bank
because account records were already voluntarily produced by
accountholders. Investigations of registered persons in particular
might not reach this stage, not only because broker-dealers and
investment advisers must produce records upon regulator request
but also because they are more likely than unregistered targets to
cooperate with an investigation. Indeed, there are potential risks to
subpoenaing targets, who might destroy documents, hide assets,
flee, or take other steps to impede investigations.189 When an
enforcer perceives this risk, it might rely on its informal options to
avoid tipping off the target.190 Enforcers must nevertheless
187. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, All-Encompassing Enforcement:
The Robust Use of Civil and Criminal Actions To Police the Markets (Mar. 31, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014-spch033114mjw
(“Criminal
investigations
unquestionably bring great value—search warrants, wiretaps, and undercover operations
are not in the SEC’s toolbox.”). Although the SEC itself does not conduct undercover
operations, it does make use of evidence gathered from state regulators’ undercover
investigations. See, e.g., Admin. Proc. No. 3-9896, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Commission
Institutes Administrative Proceeding Against Three Alleging Fraud in Offering of Prime
Bank Securities (May 11, 1999), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-7680.htm (“The
Commission today announced the institution of an administrative proceeding against three
individuals alleged to have offered, during the spring and summer of 1998, prime bank
investments to an Arizona Corporation Commission undercover investigator.”) [hereinafter
ACC Undercover Investigator].
188. An example of an undercover investigation would be an investigator requesting
offering materials from an unregistered promoter or asking the promoter questions that
establish the making of material misstatements. See, e.g., ACC Undercover Investigator, supra
note 187; Complaint at 12–13, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Mercer Cap., Inc., No. 06-81080 (S.D.
Fla. Nov. 22, 2006) (alleging that a promoter cold called an undercover Pennsylvania
securities investigator, offered him a fraudulent oil-and-gas offering at $0.50 per share, and
claimed that the shares would be worth $3.00 or $5.00 in a year’s time).
189. See Interviewee #20 (discussing these considerations).
190. Once targets know that an enforcer has opened an investigation or might bring an
enforcement action, they sometimes engage defense counsel. Targets are particularly likely
to hire counsel if a matter has the potential to result in criminal prosecution. See supra Section
II.D. Management of registered firms often handle investigations themselves, an approach
consistent with registered persons being targeted for less serious matters (e.g., compliance
issues) than unregistered persons. See Interviewee #1 (“Licensees will handle situations on
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sometimes use subpoenas or search warrants to obtain needed
information.191 Analyzing bank-account inflows and outflows
might be necessary, for example, to prove that a promoter operated
a Ponzi scheme.192 A target’s records might also allow enforcers to
identify victims who have not come forward, including those who
might not know that they are victims.
In the final stage, charging, the enforcer determines if the
investigation uncovered violations of the state’s securities statute
and, if so, what charges and venue—administrative or civil, or,
sometimes, criminal—would be most appropriate. Charges and
venue are driven in part by the conduct itself. For instance, an
enforcer might refer outright thefts for criminal prosecution.
Charges and venue are also driven by remedial concerns. A civil
lawsuit, say, might allow for injunctive relief whereas an
administrative proceeding would not.193 Victim restitution is a top
priority, followed by recidivism prevention. No interviewee
reported penalties or fines as a focus and there was skepticism
around collectability.194 This point is partly borne out in the data:
between 2012 and 2018, states imposed $1.887 billion in penalties
for securities violations, a little more than half the $3.527 billion
restitution they imposed.195
Practice varies in the charging evaluation. In some states, an
investigator or line attorney prepares a memorandum
summarizing the facts and making a recommendation, with the

their own. Their focus is to keep their license, and those are cases where someone’s not
focusing on compliance.”).
191. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
192. See Interviewee #34 (discussing bank-record analysis).
193. See generally Berdejó, supra note 7 (reviewing states’ remedial powers); see also
Interviewee #37 (discussing charging evaluations):
[I]t depends on the facts. Clearly if someone is stealing money, there’s a better
possibility that will go criminal. If it is a compliance-type violation, books-andrecords or disclosures on the CRD, it’s more likely to go administrative. If you
have a current licensee who’s stealing money, it would be administrative and
criminal to suspend or revoke license and refer to criminal. If we find ourselves
down the civil pathway for an injunction, we have the ability to freeze accounts.
Generally, we look to file a civil action if we find a pot of funds that can be frozen
for the benefit of investors.
194. See Interviewee #18 (“If we can find assets to pay back victims—that’s rare—then
we use that as an opportunity to let the public know what the fraud was all about . . . . We
always ask for a restitution order. Whether it gets collected or not is a question.”).
195. See infra APPENDIX, Table 7.
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decision to be made by the enforcement chief or the regulator’s
senior leader.196 In others, the evaluation is done through informal
consultation within the regulator.197 Even when violations have
been substantiated, enforcers sometimes exercise discretion against
charging targets who acted in good faith, lack prior history, accept
responsibility, and correct the violation by reimbursing funds or
complying with regulatory requirements.198
Apart from this modal process, distinctions in investigative
and enforcement practices abound. At least one state, for example,
invites targets to make a Wells-type submission as part of its
charging evaluation.199 Investigative practice also varies in
response to a state’s enforcement focus and local needs. Alabama,
for example, emphasizes criminal enforcement, whereas Florida
invests considerable effort into its examination program.200
Practice also reflects the size of a regulator, and indirectly, the size
of a state in terms of population and capital markets. Larger
enforcers have more hierarchical processes to manage larger
caseloads and staffs. Enforcers with smaller staffs, on the other
hand, do not require such processes. 201
196. See, e.g., Interviewee #17 (“At the end of the investigation, the investigator drafts
a report submitted to [the senior division leader and deputy leader] with recommendations
for legal action or a conclusion of no violations and a recommendation to close.”).
197. See, e.g., Interviewee #1 (discussing a regulator’s charging process).
198. See supra note 49. A number of enforcers mentioned insurance salespersons as
frequent culprits of unregistered-securities violations. See Interviewee #48 (discussing issues
with unlicensed-securities activity by insurance agents). A common problem is an insurance
licensee who sells securities based on the erroneous representation by the promoter that the
instruments being sold are not “securities.” These insurance licensees are regular targets for
enforcement. See Interviewee #42 (“[S]ome of the worst offenders are insurance agents.
I think somebody tells them it’s not a security and they believe it and sell it and make a lot
of money.”). If the sales would not have been fraudulent if made by a licensed broker-dealer
representative and the insurance licensee takes responsibility and comes into compliance
(i.e., obtains a securities license), the enforcer might not bring an action. But if the insurance
licensee were to insist, for example, that the investments were not securities, an action would
be far more likely. Interviewee #56.
199. Interviewee #52.
200. See Interviewee #4 (regarding Alabama); Interviewee #33 (same); see also
Interviewee #43 (regarding Alabama and Florida).
201. John T. Scholz & Feng Heng Wei, Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System, 80
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1249, 1258 (1986) (“State bureaucracies are small enough to be able to rely
more on informal, personal supervision than can federal bureaucracies, which require more
formal procedures, standards, and reports to ensure uniformity of actions in geographically
dispersed areas.”).
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These variations in state practice suggest a flexibility advantage
over federal authorities. The SEC’s Division of Enforcement has
1,385 personnel between its headquarters and eleven regional
offices.202 As a matter of consistency and accountability, that scale
and dispersion require standardized, hierarchical procedures for
opening, closing, conducting, and resolving enforcement cases.203
These requirements in turn would be expected to limit line
enforcers’ ability to adapt to case-by-case factors, as well as to slow
investigations. More, the sheer variety of matters handled by the
SEC—from
foreign-bribery
and
market-manipulation
investigations to insider trading—limits its ability to tailor
investigative processes to a narrower band of familiar violations,
something states perhaps can do.204
On the criminal side, U.S. attorneys’ offices have more
independence from Main Justice than SEC regional offices have
from the SEC, and, unlike the SEC, the DOJ has offices in each
state.205 Yet although the DOJ perhaps gains flexibility by being
less centralized than the SEC, it has even less ability to tailor
investigations due to its broader portfolio of civil and criminal
subject-matter jurisdictions. State securities regulators, in
contrast, are free to focus on a relatively narrow set of violation
types and to tailor their processes to their distinct geographies,
demographics, and economic profiles. These factors in turn allow
states to police local frauds with greater granularity than their
federal counterparts.206

202. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FY 2020 Budget Request Tables, in FISCAL YEAR 2020
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN 13, 15 (2020); cf. Letter
from Christopher Gerold, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, to Maxine Waters,
Chairwoman, and Patrick McHenry, Ranking Member, House Comm. on Fin. Servs. (Oct.
16, 2019) (“State securities regulators are often on the front lines in the battle against elder
exploitation. We are in every state and every community.”).
203. Cf. Scholz & Wei, supra note 201.
204. See infra APPENDIX, Table 11.
205. For example, even the U.S. attorney for the least populous state has a headquarters
and three branches. U.S. ATT’Y’S OFFICE D. WYO., Contact Us, https://www.justice.gov/
usao-wy/contact-us (last visited Oct. 16, 2021).
206. See, e.g., Interviewee #2 (“We took . . . quick action against [a regional investment
adviser] in civil court for fraud and it turned out that the firm used an options strategy and
lost $40,000,000 in one day . . . . States can often act quickly, and they don’t have the political
red tape.”).
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C. Criminal Prosecution
Most state securities violations are both civil and criminal
offenses.207 Only a small number of cases would be expected to
proceed criminally, of course. Criminal prosecution, after all, is
costly, imposes social cost in the form of correctional expense and
collateral consequences, and often is not a morally or pragmatically
appropriate response to violations that were not deliberate and that
did not harm victims. Indeed, for each criminal prosecution the
states bring, they bring seven administrative or civil actions.208 Still,
that ratio shows that states do frequently enforce their securities
laws criminally. No interviewee expressed an aversion to criminal
enforcement and several affirmatively mentioned the importance
of criminal enforcement as an enforcement option.209 It is a question
that arises early in an investigation: Does the information collected
suggest that a violation has occurred, and if it does, does the
misconduct appear to be civil or criminal in nature?210
Theft is the key divider between civil and criminal
enforcement,211 including outright fake offerings,212 misuse or

207. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 508(a) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L., amended
2005)) (excluding only violations of notice-filing and advertising-filing requirements from
criminal liability).
208. Compare infra APPENDIX, Table 1, with infra APPENDIX, Table 2.
209. See, e.g., Interviewee #29 (“If we do decide—which we do often—that the respondents
should probably be going to jail, we’ll refer those cases to the criminal authorities . . . .”).
210. See, e.g., Interviewee #50 (“[F]or some cases that appear to be so egregious that
they might be criminal, we work with outside agencies on those as co-investigators . . . .”).
211. Interviewee #18 (“[M]ost cases are assumed to be administrative or civil, until such
time that we figure out there’s fraud, theft, phony securities, Ponzi or pyramid schemes,
advanced-fee loan schemes, which immediately becomes a criminal matter.”); Interviewee
#37 (“[C]learly if someone is stealing money, there’s a better possibility that will go criminal.
If it is a compliance-type violation—books-and-records or disclosures on the CRD—it’s more
likely to go administrative.”). In comparison, during remarks at the NASAA 2020 annual
meeting, Marc Berger, deputy director of the Division of Enforcement at the SEC, also
highlighted “theft” as an SEC decision point for referring a case to criminal prosecutors.
Berger explained that he does not factor the monetary value or number of victims of the theft
into whether a criminal referral is appropriate, although those considerations might affect to
what agency he makes a referral. N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, 2020 Virtual Annual Meeting,
Developments and Trends in Enforcement (Sept. 2, 2020).
212. For example, a promoter sells securities that lack any economic substance or
intended substance.
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conversion of funds in otherwise colorably legitimate investments,213
unsuitable recommendations made by conflicted broker-dealers or
investment advisers,214 or egregious misstatements or omissions.
This approach is modal, but a state might also favor criminal
enforcement as a matter of policy and in those jurisdictions
theft-based conduct would not always be necessary for the regulator
to consider criminal prosecution to be warranted.215
This theft assessment is driven by the presence of investor harm.
Several enforcers reported that if a defendant makes victims whole,
then violations are less likely to be pursued criminally.216 Although
this practice would not be uncommon in other non-securities
criminal contexts, it does raise equitable concerns. Providing
restitution to victims is one function of criminal prosecution, but
punishing wrongful conduct, incapacitating potential recidivists,
effecting general deterrence, and expressing the community’s moral
outrage are also public functions of criminal prosecution. Allowing
well-resourced offenders to avoid criminal consequences could
undermine these criminal-law purposes.217 Not prosecuting
violators because they pay refunds also risks that they obtain
213. For example, a promoter does use some funds toward the purpose disclosed but
also uses funds in undisclosed ways or converts them to personal use.
214. For example, an investment adviser receives substantial commissions from
private-placement promoters that are not disclosed to clients.
215. See Interviewee #61 (discussing an internal policy of leaning more heavily on
criminal enforcement than other states).
216. See Interviewee #4 (discussing the administrative/criminal decision):
The ability to get money back: more likely to lean administrative rather than
criminal. If the only thing we can do is take away liberty, then criminal. If we take
a license or give them a statutory bar, they become FINRA barred. It removes them
from the securities industry going forward. And obviously administrative is
easier, less time consuming, and more expeditious.
See also Interviewee #31:
[I]t’s really hard to use civil process. If someone is stealing money, they’re
spending it. They do not have sufficient assets for a court to appoint a receiver to
marshal those assets for investors’ benefit. You have to identify perfect cases for
civil. Otherwise, we look to the criminal process as an opportunity to punish those
who commit securities crimes.
217. For example, in the first episode of Real Life Regulators, a podcast produced by
NASAA, Connecticut securities enforcers discuss a settlement in which a licensed
representative defrauded $300,000 from a customer, a loss his father repaid “so that he could
probably stay out of jail.” The regulators also discussed their due diligence to ensure that the
repayment funds were not themselves obtained through unlawful means. Real Life
Regulators, The Advisor and the Widow, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N (Jan. 2, 2020),
https://www.nasaa.org/investor-education/multimedia-library/real-life-regulators/.
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repayment funds by victimizing others, thereby putting the enforcer
in the position of incenting fraudulent behavior. To reduce this risk,
enforcers diligence repayment funds to ensure that they were not
themselves wrongfully obtained.218 Despite these equitable and
recidivism concerns, enforcers pointed to an alternative, pragmatic
view on their civil-versus-criminal determinations. Although they
prefer obtaining restitution for victims through administrative or
civil processes, in many cases—especially these involving
unregistered activity—restitution is unlikely to be paid.219 Stolen
funds will have been spent and offenders will likely never have clean
funds to satisfy restitution awards. The retributive and
incapacitating effects of a criminal conviction and sentence,220 then,
are pursued as second-choice justice.221
Although enforcers’ assessment of cases as meriting criminal
prosecution is an important step toward prosecution, they
generally do not have final say. The prosecutorial authorities they
possess fall into three categories: direct, indirect, and referral.222
A few enforcers like the Alabama Securities Commission have
direct statewide authority to prosecute criminal cases. These
enforcers empanel grand juries, seek indictments, negotiate plea
bargains, and conduct trial without the involvement of a local

218. See Interviewee #26 (“[S]ometimes we’re willing to come down off a prison type
of offer if they’re willing to pay the money. Sometimes individuals have recruited a new class
of victims and defrauded them to repay prior investors, so we’re careful about watching
where the money comes from.”).
219. See supra note 217.
220. Recidivism is also a consideration for whether criminal prosecution is appropriate.
Enforcers may decide that defendants who persists in conduct that they have already been
warned about represent a higher risk and thus may merit prosecution. See, e.g., Interviewee
#36 (“We see a lot of recidivism, two- or three-time bad actors. I try to assess, where is that
balance between allowing reform and second opportunities and being complicit in future
victimization of consumers[?]”). See also Barnard, supra note 18, at 223–24 (noting the failure
of repeated SEC civil enforcement to deter recidivists and recommending that second
offenses be referred to the DOJ for criminal prosecution).
221. See supra note 217; see also Barnard, supra note 18, at 224 (observing that criminal
prosecution can help satisfy the retributive needs of securities-fraud victims).
222. It is difficult to quantify a breakdown because some regulators’ criminalenforcement roles are partly statutory and partly based on informal arrangements with instate prosecutorial agencies. Although many enforcers were interviewed for this Article, the
data are insufficient to assign states to these categories with high confidence.
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prosecutor or a member of the attorney general’s office.223 When a
securities regulator is located in an attorney general’s office, the
agency might have direct prosecutorial authority, but the regulator
itself would need to refer the case internally.
Several enforcers have indirect prosecutorial authority. Under
this model, a local or federal prosecutor must agree to bring a case
it has jurisdiction over, but the case is handled by an attorney from
the regulator who is seconded as a special assistant district attorney
or special assistant U.S. attorney.224 Some large urban counties have
economic-crime units that do not need assistance from seconded
regulator attorneys, whereas suburban and rural counties do.225
These secondments are especially likely to happen in localities
whose prosecutors lack time, resources, or expertise to prosecute
securities crimes.226 In contrast, in areas with economic-crime
specialists, local law enforcement and prosecutors sometimes
source and prosecute securities cases without any involvement
from, or even the knowledge of, civil regulators.227
But in most states, securities regulators have neither direct nor
indirect prosecutorial authority. When they determine that a case
merits criminal prosecution, they refer it to a local prosecutor, the

223. One prosecutor in a mid-size county spoke about the barriers to prosecuting a
securities case: “I do murders and rapes and drug dealers, and so a securities case is utterly and
completely foreign. A lot of paper, bank records. The statutes are utterly foreign to me. It was
awfully daunting. I’ve done maybe three, and I’ve been doing this for 22 years.” Interviewee
#55. The prosecutor also explained that without investigative and trial assistance from the state
securities regulator, bringing a criminal securities case would be infeasible: “[D]oing a securities
case without someone who specializes in that area, I can’t imagine. They had to take me to
school to teach me how to stand up.” Id.; see also Interviewee #12 (“Most DA offices don’t have
forensic accounting to look at offerings and contracts and promissory notes . . . . They’re
intimidated by securities-fraud cases and usually put those off.”).
224. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-57(b) (“[T]he district attorney may request that a
duly employed attorney of the [state securities regulator] prosecute or assist in the
prosecution of the [securities-law] violation or violations on behalf of the State. Upon
approval of the [state securities regulator], the employee may be appointed a special
prosecutor for the district attorney . . . .”).
225. See Interviewee #12 (describing the economic-crimes unit in a big-city district
attorney’s office).
226. Id.
227. The criminal-enforcement data discussed in this Article are incomplete and
undercounted because they are reported by state securities regulators. Although these
enforcers are an important node for most securities cases in their states, some prosecutions
occur without their knowledge. Id.
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state attorney general, or a U.S. attorney’s office.228 Interviewees
described these referrals as a package of investigative materials
that, they hope, allow the referee to quickly get up to speed, avoid
duplicative investigation, and move efficiently.229 Experience is
mixed whether the regulator remains involved in the criminal
matter beyond the point of referral, a question that relies heavily on
the working relationships between regulators and their
counterparts. In many instances, the regulator’s investigators and
examiners actively consult with prosecutors or provide ongoing
technical assistance and securities-law expertise.230 In other
instances, securities regulators make referrals and then hear little
about what happened to the referral.231
For both the indirect-authority and referral states, the leader of
the securities division, or its parent agency, has ultimate control
over bringing and settling civil and administrative actions, but
leaders typically do not have direct influence over how seconded
or referred cases are handled.232 Those decisions are left to the
prosecutorial authority. Yet despite having criminal jurisdiction,
many local prosecutors lack the expertise to prosecute securities
cases, which present a different set of legal issues and fact patterns
than street crimes at the heartland of local criminal dockets.233
Interviews with local prosecutors suggested, however, that
securities frauds involving individual victims are not wholly
228. Interviewees noted that they refer matters to federal prosecutors if the cases have
substantial interstate aspects, given the federal advantage in marshalling witnesses and
resources nationally. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. One interviewee offered
local prosecutors’ lack of expertise and resources as a reason for referring cases federally.
Interviewee #20.
229. See Interviewee #20 (“[W]e try to package a case up that’s tight. . . . We will have
conversations with them, declarations for them. We had [a securities enforcer] testify in a
trial this year.”).
230. See Interviewee #6; Interviewee #37; Interviewee #55 (discussing their postreferral consultative roles).
231. See, e.g., Interviewee #33 (“[W]e have our files that we have put together and hand
to them and say we think this merits prosecution. We have no coordination other than
that. . . . They’ll tell us if they get an indictment or they settle, but beyond that we don’t have
a whole lot.”).
232. See, e.g., Interviewee #44 (“Once we began a criminal investigation and we would
begin working with U.S. attorneys or even local prosecutors, I stepped away. I had no
interaction with the investigative team. They were free to work with prosecutors.”).
233. See supra note 224.

118

119

State Securities Enforcement

different from other street crimes. These prosecutors reported
learning the substantive securities law, sometimes with the
assistance of expert witnesses or seconded regulator attorneys.234
As with other types of criminal cases, securities prosecutions
typically end with negotiated guilty pleas.235 But cases do
sometimes go to trial. Prosecutors reported that their evidence at
trial is often overwhelming and that juries are able to appreciate
complex securities concepts like the materiality of misstatements or
omissions.236 They also note that cases are often bolstered by
sympathetic victims237—ordinary people who have lost personally
meaningful sums—although juries also convict when the victims
are wealthy individuals who remain so even after experiencing
securities fraud.238
D. Coordination and Cooperation
Section 608 of the Uniform Securities Act instructs regulators to
“cooperate, coordinate, consult, and, subject to [the act’s
data-protection provisions], share records and information” with
other state and provincial securities regulators, the SEC, the DOJ,
the CFTC, the FTC, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation,
self-regulatory organizations, banking and insurance regulators,
and other law-enforcement agencies.239 This section sketches how
they abide that instruction.
State-to-state cooperation is extensive. State enforcers talk to
each other frequently about matters of common interest. This

234. See Interviewee #6 (discussing this process).
235. See Interviewee #12; infra note 237.
236. Interviewee #12:
One out of five cases go to jury trial. We’ve had very good success going to trial.
Juries are pretty typically offended by the conduct. There are clear financial
pictures: taking the money for personal use, pretty salacious uses. Guys buy
airplanes, condos, tens of thousands on trips to Vegas or the Caribbean. We’re able
to paint a good picture such that juries are outraged.
But see Interviewee #30 (discussing the difficulty of conveying securities concepts to juries).
237. Interviewee #6 (“Our case was really sympathetic. A lot of victimization. This
guy just fleeced these people and lied to them and used his church to take advantage. One
victim was early 40s, developmentally disabled. Not in every case do you have that, and
here we did.”).
238. See Interviewee #12 (discussing a securities-fraud trial that resulted in a conviction
despite the victim being “filthy rich and not likable”).
239. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 608 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L., amended 2005).
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informal communication is often about enforcement concerns, but
not always. For example, some interviewees mentioned that there
had been state-to-state communication about this Article and the
progress of its interviews. This informal horizontal coordination is
supplemented, and facilitated by, formal coordination through
NASAA. NASAA has 23 employees and an approximately
$7 million annual budget, with the bulk of its revenue coming from
the Series 63, 65, and 66 licensing examinations and notice-filing
fees.240 NASAA serves as a focal point for state enforcers to
communicate face-to-face and to develop personal relationships
that foster coordination. The association’s work is driven by
subject-matter committees whose volunteer members work at state
regulators.241 They include committees for enforcement, which
oversees topical working groups for commodities and derivatives
enforcement, training, publications and manuals, and
technology.242 Apart from the national and continental
coordination it fosters, NASAA sponsors eight geographic
“enforcement zones,” which allow for coordination around
regional concerns.243 A number of enforcers reported membership
in regional financial-crime taskforces of state agencies, the SEC,
U.S. attorneys’ offices, the FBI, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service,
FINRA, the IRS, and other agencies.244 These taskforces meet
periodically to discuss regional trends and issues.245 Although these
meetings provide an opportunity for building personal
relationships that might be expected to facilitate cooperation, the
agencies generally do not share information about their
investigations at them.246
This limited sharing might be driven by disclosure restrictions,
like grand-jury proceedings, or prudential discretion.247 Yet it does
240. See N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, IRS Form 990 (2018) (on file with author).
241. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 501.
242. See Committees and Project Groups, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, https://www.nasaa.org/
about/committees-and-project-groups/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2021).
243. See Interviewee #24 (discussing regional coordination via NASAA enforcement zones).
244. See, e.g., Interviewee #8 (describing membership in a financial-crime taskforce
whose members include FBI, IRS, and Postal Inspection representatives).
245. See Interviewee #25 (discussing regional meetings).
246. Id.; see also Interviewee #25; infra note 250.
247. Cf. Thomas Brewster, Massive Oklahoma Government Data Leak Exposes 7 Years of FBI
Investigations, FORBES (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/
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contrast with interviewees’ descriptions of open communication
and coordination among state enforcers.248 One interviewee
reported, for example, not notifying federal authorities before
bringing actions, nor receiving that courtesy in return; the
interviewee would, however, coordinate filings with sister states
that planned to bring cases against the same defendants.249 Another
enforcer noted that referrals from the SEC—of complaints the SEC
itself chose not to pursue—come heavily redacted, with even the
alleged misconduct being redacted.250 In contrast, an enforcer in
one state would not hesitate to call colleagues in neighboring states
to discuss a matter that could cross their borders.251 These
distinctions imply robust horizontal coordination among state
enforcers and comparatively weaker vertical coordination. Strong
horizontal coordination would be expected to allow states more
easily to see a complete view of related violations affecting multiple
jurisdictions, an advantage that federal agencies forgo if their
investigations are kept overly siloed.

2019/01/16/massive-oklahoma-government-data-leak-exposes-7-years-of-fbiinvestigations/?sh=4ee08e256e11.
248. But cf. Interviewee #31:
We have [several] personnel detailed at FBI offices. They work at those FBI offices
[several] days a week as part of state-federal taskforces investigating securities
violations. It gives us access to [a] broad range of investigative tools and
prosecutorial remedies. It gives us the opportunity to discover cases we otherwise
would lose, access to critical information such as [method omitted] that can tip us
off to fraud schemes before the[y] collapse. It’s an opportunity to pursue criminal
remedies without having bureaucratic road block[s] or red tape between state and
federal prosecutors.
249. Interviewee #28. Compare Interviewee #25:
I think there’s ebb and flow at the SEC. Certainly from the line attorneys to us is
very good. But I think as you get higher up, the SEC tends to be more cautious on
sharing information. The SEC is not calling me to tell me when they’re filing cases
in [my state]. On the flip side I’m not necessarily calling them. But we do share
information and run into one another in investigations. If I have a lot of time and
resources in the case, I’m not going to drop it just because they’re in it. I’m open
to cooperating, filing on the same day. If they’re really far ahead, I might let them
have it unless I have compelling reasons to get involved[,]
with id. (“Cooperation among agencies, state to state, is fabulous. . . . I can pick up the phone
and talk to any state administrator and get cooperation from them and there’s no infighting
about who brings a case, whose turf is it.”).
250. Interviewee #53.
251. Id.
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E. Multistate Coalitions
Beyond policing local frauds, regulators have formed
multistate coalitions to investigate the financial industry, major
national firms, and whole product lines.252 In a multistate coalition,
state regulators share personnel and other resources while
investigating large, complex organizations or whole industries.253
When coalition investigations identify cross-border violations of
state laws, states are able to obtain global settlements to resolve
them. Global settlements are efficient not only for states but also for
targets: they allow targets to avoid overlapping investigations and
transaction costs while receiving global releases of potential
public-enforcement claims against them.254 This practice developed
organically, but the contemporary process for multistate
enforcement emerged from the Prudential-Bache scandal of the
early 1990s and the microcap sweeps of the late 1990s.255 That model
has carried to the present.256
Coalitions form to coordinate and provide investigative
economies of scale over misconduct that is widespread but that
shares characteristics with local frauds that states regularly police.
For example, a broker-dealer operating a “boiler room” might
conduct business nationwide, but its tactics and effects are similar
to any local fraudster who sells worthless securities. Coalitions can
also serve political purposes. After the passage of NSMIA, for
example, regulators were eager to prove that they continued to play

252. See infra APPENDIX, Table 13, for a selected list of multistate actions and their
results. See also Operation Cryptosweep, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, https://www.nasaa.org/
policy/enforcement/operation-cryptosweep/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2021) (discussing a
multistate task force focused on fraudulent cryptocurrency offerings resulting in eighty-five
enforcement actions).
253. Elysa M. Dishman, Enforcement Piggybacking and Multistate Actions, 2019 BYU
L. REV. 421, 450 (observing that multistate actions allow state enforcers to pool resources so
as to take on more challenging targets).
254. Contra id. at 451 (suggesting that multistate actions lead states to piggyback on each
other’s investigations, causing overenforcement rather than preventing overenforcement by
allocating a single settlement among states and giving targets a global release).
255. Interviewee #43; Interviewee #56.
256. See infra APPENDIX, Table 13.

122

123

State Securities Enforcement

a vital role in investor protection, and the sweeps of boiler-room
brokerages were pursued with that goal in mind.257
A typical multistate coalition begins when a state identifies a
potential issue and its enforcement chief presents a theory of the
case, persuading others to join.258 Multistate securities coalitions are
thus in large part driven by the personalities, and personal
initiative, of individuals. This individual initiative would generally
be from a member of the civil service rather than an elected official
or political appointee.259 Although NASAA does not drive coalition
formation, its committees—particularly its enforcement
committee—serve as fora that facilitate coalition building among
representatives from the states.260
When a multistate investigation forms, states fill one of four
roles: leader, taskforce member, non-taskforce member, or nonmember. The operational unit of a coalition is a taskforce
comprising four to six states, with the state that identified the issue
commonly serving as leader or, in some instances, sharing that role
with another state.261 Leadership selection might also be influenced
by an enforcer’s expertise on a target.262 For example, an enforcer
that has examination experience with a particular broker-dealer
might bring existing knowledge to bear in a multistate
investigation of that firm. Within a taskforce, all members
contribute investigative resources, thereby reducing states’
disadvantage in conducting large, complex, nationwide
investigations. Splitting the workload also allows taskforce
members to maintain adequate local enforcement activity. That is,
apart from coalition resource-sharing, they would not have
personnel to respond to day-to-day complaints and referrals and
conduct a largescale investigation on their own.263 Disagreements
257. Interviewee #43. Interviewee #43 gave particularly comprehensive insight into
multistate coalitions and so is relied on most heavily in this section. Other interviewees
offered consistent insights.
258. Id.
259. Although it might be imagined that elected agency leaders would have political
incentives to seek out multistate actions, no interviewee familiar with the multistate process
described elected leaders or their political appointees as having a driving role in initiating
multistate cases. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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sometimes arise within taskforces over work and settlement
allocations.264 These disagreements must be resolved
interpersonally: taskforces make decisions through consensus, and
there are no governing procedures other than practice accumulated
from prior multistate matters.265
For industry-wide investigations, multiple taskforces form.266
Each focuses on a single firm; for example, one taskforce for
Goldman Sachs, another for J.P. Morgan, and so on.267 This
approach is pragmatic in that investigating any given firm is a
whole taskforce of work. It also presents the possibility that
coordinated, but parallel, investigations allow for more dynamic
and flexible factfinding than if a single agency investigated
multiple firms at the same time. This state advantage could be lost,
of course, if states fail to share information adequately and thus
miss out on investigative economies of scale.
Once a coalition has formed, NASAA sometimes funds travel,
conferences, and experts.268 This direct support helps overcome a
potential collective-action problem. Taskforce states contribute
substantial staff hours that could result in enforcement actions
being joined by a larger group of non-taskforce coalition members.
Without NASAA funding, taskforce membership would mean not
only contributing personnel hours, but also making cash outlays
from already limited enforcement budgets. This financial burden
would incent states not to join a taskforce but instead to free ride. If
states became unwilling to bear the financial cost of participating in
taskforces, then there would be no multistate investigations to free
ride on.
When investigations uncover violations, the taskforce negotiates
a settlement with the target firm.269 The lead state drafts and

264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Industry cases emerge when a concerning practice at one firm appears to be
common in the industry.
267. Interviewee #43.
268. Id.
269. Multistate investigations do not necessarily lead to settlement. In the microcap
sweep of the late 1990s, states coordinated to file actions on the same day against a number
of broker-dealers operating as boiler rooms. Firms caught up in the sweep had to close. Id.
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conducts negotiations, but taskforce members have input.270
Although non-taskforce states do not have formal input in
investigations or settlements, the taskforce provides them with
periodic updates.271 Taskforces present settlement agreements in
largely final form, subject to state-by-state technical
customizations.272 After review by the NASAA board and president
for their endorsements, states decide whether to join.273 Not all states
join settlements. The Investor Protection Bureau of the New York
attorney general and the Securities Division of the Massachusetts
secretary of the commonwealth often act independently of other
states.274 Other enforcers decline to join settlements that they view as
imposing inadequate sanctions.275 But to avoid undercutting sister
states, these holdouts do informally agree not to bring actions,
provided that settling firms offer the same relief to their in-state
victims as to settling states’ residents.276 Enforcers also decline to join
settlements due to philosophical disagreement with the actions
themselves.277 The non-joining states’ silence is important because a
coalition’s ability to give defendants a global release is a critical point
of leverage for taskforce negotiations. If too many states go their own
way, targets would be less willing to engage, and give, in

270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Interviewee #25 (discussing New York and Massachusetts in bringing their own
cases).
275. Interviewee #43.
276. Id. State regulators have special incentive to join a global settlement if their
allocation of the settlement fund is greater than the statutory maximum they could directly
impose in civil-money penalties. In other words, a defendant might agree to a global
settlement that in effect provides some states with better resolutions than if they acted alone.
For example, in 2008 the North Carolina secretary of state joined a global settlement with
Wachovia Capital Markets in connection with the market-analyst multistate investigation;
its share of the nearly $25 million settlement was $611,526. This share was deposited in the
agency’s investor-protection fund, which state law designated for settlement proceeds. See
Consent Order, Wachovia Capital Markets, LLC, N.C. Sec’y of State, Case No. 02-030-RF
(July 31, 2006). Under the North Carolina Securities Act, however, the agency would have
been limited to imposing a $25,000 penalty, which it would have been required to be
deposited in the state’s civil-money-penalty fund, had it brought the case directly. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-47(c) (2001).
277. Interviewee #43.
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negotiations, thereby undermining the efficacy of multistate
coalitions as an enforcement mechanism.278
Multistate investigations sometimes result in settlements that
have considerable impacts on the financial industry and that garner
the kind of press attention often seen for major SEC or DOJ actions.
State enforcers, for example, drove multiple broker-dealers that
used boiler-room tactics out of business during the late 1990s.279 In
that sense, the states’ “Wall Street” investigations appear
inconsistent with their “Main Street” priorities, as well as this
Article’s conclusions that states have advantages in policing
local frauds and thus focus their efforts on that front. This
inconsistency might prompt questioning the propriety of multistate
coalitions within the national securities-enforcement system, and
indeed some of the literature does raise that concern.280 Yet the
history of multistate coalitions reveals a process in which states’
on-the-ground work exposes systemic securities violations in kind

278. Interviewee #56 (“[T]he [defendant] would say ‘I need a global resolution. I can’t
settle with just California, Florida, and New York: a bunch of other states might come in and
piggyback . . . .”). SERPENT ON THE ROCK provides an account of not only the multistate
Prudential-Bache investigation, but also the taskforce’s settlement negotiations with
Prudential executives. After a breakdown in negotiations, taskforce members prepared to
brief their sister-state colleagues at a NASAA conference on the expectation that without a
global settlement, states would pursue separate enforcement actions, including revoking the
firm’s broker-dealer licenses. Faced with this credible threat, however, Prudential ultimately
agreed to the taskforce’s demands. See EICHENWALD, supra note 147, at 414–27.
279. Interviewee #43.
280. For example, the Rose & LeBlanc study found that firms disclosing a public-enforcer
securities investigation also reported a striking 93% rate of being investigated by at least one
other securities enforcer for the “same or related misconduct.” See Rose & LeBlanc, supra note
7, at 421. Taking multistate actions into account makes that figure less striking, however. The
study showed that 85% of the disclosed investigations related to “highly publicized industrywide scandals.” Id. The mutual-fund market-timing scandal accounts for 46% of the study’s
disclosure occurrences. Id. That case was first uncovered by state regulators and pursued
through the multistate-coalition framework, suggesting that at least 46% of the events in the
study represented coordinated, rather than independent, action and decision-making.
Interviewee #43; see also Ensuring Effectiveness, Fairness, and Transparency in Securities Law
Enforcement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cap. Mkts., Sec., & Inv., 115th Cong. 116 (2018)
(statement of Joseph P. Borg, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n) (“[I]t should be noted that
state securities regulators are often first to discover and investigate our nation’s largest
frauds. . . . [From] ‘market timing’ in mutual funds, and to uncovering problems in the auction
rate securities market, state securities regulators have consistently been in the lead.”).
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with the localized frauds they focus on day-to-day.281 What
happens in one place might happen in and affect local investors in
towns and cities across the country. In those cases, it would be a
logical extension for states to take a coordinated approach once
they discover that their in-state cases are part of larger patterns.
IV. STATE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT AS RESIDUAL
SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT
State and federal authorities and private plaintiffs all play a role
in the national securities-enforcement system. Drawing from the
institutional account of Parts I, II, and III, this Part frames the states
as the nation’s residual securities enforcers. All in, state enforcers
reported being willing, and indeed obliged, to respond to violations
too small in scale or scope for federal enforcement. State enforcers
also police cases that private plaintiffs might not. Plaintiffs’
attorneys explained that losses of a few thousand, or tens of
thousands of dollars are uneconomical to litigate in court or FINRA
arbitration and thus they cannot help small-dollar victims who
appear to have meritorious claims.282 Claimants could bring arbitral
claims pro se or with the aid of pro bono counsel, such as
law-school securities clinics, but many claimants will lack the
sophistication needed to represent themselves successfully and the
demand for pro bono representation likely outstrips supply.
These points suggest that many frauds fall into an enforcement
gap. Federal enforcers lack the resources or willingness to take
routine fraud cases falling below threshold $Xfed in investor losses,
whereas private attorneys lack the economic incentive to bring
cases below threshold $Xpriv,283 which is usually lower than $Xfed but
281. Ensuring Effectiveness, Fairness, and Transparency in Securities Law Enforcement:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cap. Mkts., Sec., & Inv., 115th Cong. 116 (2018); see also
Interviewee #56.
282. See Interviewee #7; Interviewee #9; Interviewee #10 (discussing private attorneys’
inability to accept small-dollar securities cases).
283. The SEC or DOJ might still take cases with low loss amounts (or no investor harm
at all) if the cases align with broader enforcement-policy priorities, such as small-dollar
insider trading, delinquent filings, or improper use of confidentiality provisions in severance
agreements. See, e.g., Complaint at 1, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Yan, No. 1:17-cv-05257
(S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2017) (alleging $120,000 in illicit insider-trading gains); Cease-and-Desist
Order for Admin. Proc. No. 3-17396, Health Net, Inc. (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Aug. 16, 2016)
(ordering an issuer to clarify to former employees that the confidentiality provisions in their
severance agreements did not prohibit making disclosures to the SEC).
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still far greater than $0.284 If a defendant is insolvent—as would be
the case in many financial street crimes—then private enforcement
is infeasible regardless the loss amount because there is no chance
for recovery. That leaves only state enforcers to take cases involving
investor losses between $0 and $Xpriv. Although enforcement
overlaps could hypothetically occur between securities enforcers
and impose social costs through duplicative enforcement or
overenforcement, there is still a large slice of localized, small-dollar
frauds for which public enforcement by state regulators or prosecutors
is realistically the only recourse. State enforcers recognized this gap as
a driver of their enforcement missions,285 believing that for many
cases, if they do not investigate and (when needed) take action, no one
will.286 The following figure illustrates these gaps between what
actions federal, private-plaintiff, and state enforcers will bring, even if
they share overlapping enforcement authority:

Of course, states are not the only public enforcers with
jurisdiction over the small-dollar theft-based violations at the core
of this Article’s account. The SEC and DOJ have jurisdiction, too.
But their own resource constraints limit their efforts to matters that
either meet high loss thresholds—such as public-company

284. See James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An
Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 744 (2003).
285. Cf. id.; see also Interviewee #50; Interviewee #53 (expressing this sentiment).
286. Cf. Interviewee #4 (“Our priority is always to right any economic wrongdoing. There’s
no case too small for us. Some have been too big for us, but we’ve taken them on anyway.”).
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accounting frauds, major interstate Ponzi schemes287—or that
involve national priorities like insider trading.288 Some point to
high levels of undetected or unprosecuted securities violations and
have urged increased federal white-collar enforcement and
increased budgets to address those matters. Yet the role of state
regulators, as well as state prosecutors and law-enforcement
agencies, is missing from those calls for greater white-collar
enforcement. For most securities cases, these agencies are closest to
victims and, often, offenders. This Article’s account suggests that
even if the SEC and DOJ were to receive substantial new resources
for white-collar enforcement, state public enforcement would
remain a necessary part of the national securities-enforcement
system. That is because states enjoy two key advantages—detection
granularity and institutional decentralization—over their federal
counterparts that uniquely enable them to police local frauds.
First, detection granularity: state enforcers are better situated
than federal counterparts to detect highly localized frauds and to
work directly with the victims of those frauds.289 This capacity is a
function of local and in-state enforcement networks: victims are
most likely to seek out private attorneys or local or state law
enforcement, who can in turn channel complaints to the state
regulator in its role as an expert hub. Federal enforcers, on the other
hand, are unlikely to have similar in-state enforcement networks
because they lack the physical presence and resources to foster
them, much less to follow up on leads they generate.290
And second, institutional decentralization: as distinct
regulators that also closely cooperate with each other, state
enforcers can—by diversifying their perspectives, know-how, and

287. See supra notes 39, 157 and accompanying text.
288. See infra APPENDIX, Table 11.
289. See Rose, supra note 24, at 2208 (considering the possibility that state securities
regulators have detection advantages over federal authorities, in part because they are more
accessible to complainants).
290. It is conceivable that the SEC would expand its regional presence from eleven
regional offices to fifty. And the DOJ already has multiple offices in each state. Yet it is likely
that coordination between agencies that are part of the same sovereign unit would still be
able to interact more cohesively than federal and local agencies could. State law, for example,
predominates in the lives of both local police and prosecutors and state regulators, and all
share their states’ broad civil-service cultures and norms. Victims might also be more likely
to trust local and state authorities over federal authorities who, even when they are
physically nearby, might seem remote and inscrutable.
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techniques—avoid the myopic enforcement priorities and potential
for capture that can manifest within centralized enforcement
agencies.291 No single administration controls state securities
enforcement in terms of priorities, techniques, or remedies. If some
states identify a new form of securities misconduct or a new,
problematic product, they might alert their sister states, some of
whom might have been unaware that their residents are
experiencing similar problems. Yet although state securities
enforcement is headless, it is not leaderless: through close
cooperation among states, it takes only a few enterprising enforcers
to elevate an interstate issue to national or regional attention or to
develop new approaches or policies to address common issues.
Together, these advantages complicate views that concurrent
state and federal jurisdictions risk wasted resources or
overenforcement on one hand, while on the other hand creating the
potential for healthy regulatory competition and protection against
capture.292 To the extent that the literature has considered state
securities enforcement, it has generally done so with some implicit
assumption that state and federal enforcers target the same types of
cases, if not the very same cases.293 This Article has shown, though,
that public securities enforcement is predominantly not “state and
federal” or “state versus federal,” but rather is either/or.294 States
have residual enforcement missions, and their constraints restrict
them mostly to those missions, like tackling the complaints from
investors calling, writing, or walking into their offices. A lack of
appetite to expand these missions is shown by states’ readiness to
refer cases they perceive as better suited for an SEC regional office,
291. John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of
Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 BUS. LAW. 447, 454 (1995)
(observing that regulatory competition can lead to costly turf battles, but that it can also
guard against myopic policymaking and agency capture).
292. See generally supra note 6 and accompanying text.
293. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have
a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 763 (2009); Jones, supra note 6, at 121–26; Jonathan R. Macey,
Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate Governance: The
Coming Preemption of the Martin Act, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 951, 973 (2005). But see Berdejó,
supra note 7 (focusing on state policing of local securities frauds).
294. This Article touches on the exceptions—like multistate coalitions focused on
systemic industry or market practices—but they are limited departures from typical state
practice and largely grow out of their day-to-day policing.
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a U.S. attorney’s office, or another in-state agency. The expected
presence of substantial numbers of undetected local frauds
suggests that even if state-enforcement resources were significantly
increased, that would merely enable states to pick up slack rather
than newly pursue “national” cases. For its part, the SEC faces its
own resource constraints and so refers cases that it sees as better
aligned with its state counterparts’ work.
True, with different incentives and mutually plentiful
resources, there could be turf battles between state and federal
actors that would raise economic-federalism concerns of resource
waste and overenforcement. But now, the state and federal turfs are
largely distinct, and it is doubtful that that condition will
appreciably change in the future. In that light, state and federal
authorities follow a roughly nonoverlapping allocation reflective of
each actor exploiting its advantages, adhering to its institutional
constraints, and pursuing its perceived enforcement mission.
Given that existing allocation, if it is accepted that local frauds
and their victims matter, then state enforcement is necessary.
Neither federal enforcers nor private attorneys have resources or
incentives to police a large number of securities violations that,
although small in the scale of the capital markets, are personally
meaningful to individual investors. But state regulators,
consistent with the resource constraints they operate under, take
all comers. They are the nation’s residual securities enforcers.
Federal authorities and private plaintiffs, in contrast, serve
specialized roles within the national system of securities
enforcement. Together they handle cases that are particularly
large in dollar terms, that have interstate or international scope,
or that respond to national priorities. From there, states provide
many victims and would-be victims with their only line of
defense. Considerations of securities law and policy, then, are
incomplete when states are missing from view.
This state-federal allocation should guide securities enforcers as
they cooperate and complement each other’s enforcement missions.
Given state advantages at policing local frauds, and assuming that
the rough state-federal allocation under current conditions holds,
this Article’s call is simple, broad, and forward-looking: as federal
policymakers and scholars consider or seek changes to national
securities policy, they should do so in ways that bolster states’
residual enforcement work or that at least mitigate negative impacts
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on it. Although it is hard to predict where this call may lead, or how
heeding it might manifest, this Part’s closing footnotes offer three
illustrative examples around exempt-offering notice filings,295
whistleblower protection,296 and broker-dealer regulation.297
CONCLUSION
This Article has addressed a gap in the literature by
providing the first institutional account of who state securities
enforcers are, what motivates them, and what they do to police
local capital markets and protect local investors. It has identified
two key advantages—detection granularity and institutional
295. Consider the exclusion of federally covered securities from state ex-ante
regulation. Interviewees expressed concern that the expansion of federally covered
transactions harms states’ capital-markets surveillance because promoters do not comply
with still-valid state notice-filing requirements. This effect makes it hard to stop frauds in
their tracks rather than after investors have already suffered substantial losses. See supra note
172 and accompanying text. Expanding the scope of private offerings, and preempting
ex-ante state registration requirements in the process, could perhaps affect sound economic
and regulatory policy. If that is the policy that policymakers will pursue, or scholars will
advocate, however, it is worth considering how the policy might inadvertently facilitate
fraud and how to mitigate that risk. For example, the availability of federal exemptions for
covered securities under NSMIA could be conditioned on making notice filings that are
mandated by state law, which can be done via a single filing in NASAA’s EFD system.
Although NSMIA continues to permit state notice-filing requirements, a conditioning rule
like the one just described would provide a substantive federal bulwark for state surveillance
and enforcement capability without requiring any outlay of federal resources or significant
effort on the part of those engaging in covered transactions. See supra note 172 and
accompanying text.
296. The Dodd-Frank Act contains a provision that protects securities whistleblowers
from retaliation. The substantive protection includes blowing the whistle internally inside a
company, yet the provision’s definition of “whistleblower” is one who provides information
“to the [Securities and Exchange] Commission,” thus rendering the provision’s non-SEC
reporting channels largely ineffective for qualifying for anti-retaliation protection. See Digital
Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 770 (2018). But NASAA, after public comment,
has issued a new model whistleblower act that gives anti-retaliation protections to internalonly whistleblowers. N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, MODEL WHISTLEBLOWER AWARD AND
PROTECTION ACT (2020).
297. The SEC’s adoption of Regulation Best Interest sets a standard for broker-dealer
conduct that falls short of a fiduciary standard, which some states have adopted. See
Melkonyan, supra note 3, at 1598 (“California, Missouri, South Carolina, and South Dakota
courts have been clear about uniformly imposing fiduciary duty under common law.”)
Although Regulation BI does not appear to preempt stricter state standards, see generally id.,
if future amendments to it were to force a national standard, settled expectations for in-state
securities-industry behavior and enforcement could be disrupted in states that now impose
a fiduciary standard.
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decentralization—that states enjoy over their federal counterparts
in policing localized frauds involving individual, often
small-dollar, victims.
Based on this evidence, this Article concludes that state and
federal securities enforcement are largely complementary, not
theaters of turf battles. Thus, under current conditions of
enforcement incentives and resource constraints, state and federal
authorities follow a roughly non-overlapping enforcement
allocation reflective of each exploiting its advantages, adhering to its
institutional constraints, and pursuing its perceived enforcement
mission. And states enjoy considerable advantages in policing the
local turf. In light of these advantages, the need for local investor
protection, and the states’ role as residual securities enforcers, this
Article calls on federal policymakers and scholars to bolster state
enforcement work and to mitigate negative impacts on it when
considering or seeking changes to national securities policy.
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APPENDIX

Table 1: State-securities regulator and SEC enforcement actions,
2012–2018.298
Year
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
AVG

Administrative Actions
Civil Actions
Total Actions
SEC States States % SEC States States % SEC States States %
462 1,925
417%
272
232
85%
734
2,157
294%
469 1,740
370%
207
182
88%
676
1,922
284%
610 1,634
268%
145
137
115%
755
1,771
235%
645 1,630
253%
162
152
94%
807
1,782
221%
692 1,606
232%
176
138
78%
868
1,744
201%
—
1,682
—
—
116
—
754
1,798
238%
—
1,640
—
—
146
—
821
1,786
218%
—
1,694
—
—
158
—
774
1,826
239%

Table 2: State and federal criminal securities cases, 2013–2017.299
Year
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
AVG

DOJ*
283
237
218
221
230
234

States
262
271
253
241
255
256

States (as % of DOJ)
93%
114%
116%
109%
111%
109%

298. These statistics are excerpted from two sets of reports: the NASAA annual
enforcement surveys, and the SEC’s enforcement annual reports. State statistics are
excerpted from the 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019 NASAA enforcement surveys
(on file with author and available at N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS,
https://www.nasaa.org/policy/enforcement-statistics (Jan. 16, 2020)). SEC statistics are
excerpted from the SEC’s 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 enforcement reports
(on file with author and available at SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORTS AND PUBLICATIONS,
https://www.sec.gov/reports (Jan. 16, 2020)).
299. State statistics are excerpted from the NASAA 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018
annual enforcement surveys. See N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, supra note 298. Federal statistics
are excerpted from U.S. Sentencing Commission abstracts on securities and investmentfraud offenses, see Quick Facts, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/research/
quick-facts/quick-facts-archives (last visited Jan. 20, 2020); COURTNEY SEMISCH, U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, WHAT DOES FEDERAL ECONOMIC CRIME REALLY LOOK LIKE? (2019),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2019/20190130_Econ-Crime.pdf. DOJ data refer to convicted offenders only.
State criminal data in Table 2 are likely undercounted. State regulators provide the
information for this survey, but they do not always know if their criminal referrals result in
prosecutions or if prosecutors bring cases without them.
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Table 3: Top reported state securities-fraud issues, 2012–2015.300
1
2
3
4
5
6

2012
Rule 506 offerings
Oil and gas
Ponzi schemes
Real estate
Affinity fraud
Precious metals

2013
Ponzi schemes
Real estate
Internet fraud
Rule 506 offerings
Affinity fraud
Oil and gas

2014
Ponzi schemes
Rule 506 offerings
Real estate
Internet fraud
Oil and gas
—

2015
Ponzi schemes
Real estate
Oil and gas
Internet fraud
Affinity fraud
—

Table 4: State enforcement investigations by
product/scheme type.301
2017 or 2018
enforcement actions

DE*

FL*

MI

MN

RI

SD

WI

Affinity fraud
Annuities – equity indexed
Annuities – variable
Commodities – precious metals
Commodities – non-precious metals
EB-5 Visa Fraud
Exchange-Traded Funds/Notes
Foreign exchange
Hedge/private-equity funds
Internet or social-media fraud
Life and viatical settlements
Marijuana-industry investments
Oil-and-gas investments/interests
Ponzi and pyramid schemes
Promissory notes
Real-estate investments
Rule 506(b) offerings (no general solicitation)
Rule 506(c) offerings (general solicitation)

0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

95
0
0
0
4
0
0
2
6
0
0
0
2
12
10
0
0
0

6
0
3
2
0
0
7
2
8
9
1
0
2
15
0
56
3
2

1
0
45
0
0
0
0
1
1
4
0
1
2
2
3
2
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
4
3
0
14

2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
0
4
3
3
5
1
1

300. These data are excerpted from the NASAA 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 annual
enforcement surveys. See N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, supra note 298.
301. These data are extracted from the Michigan, Minnesota, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, and Wisconsin responses to the NASAA Enforcement Survey—Covering the 2018
Calendar Year and from the Delaware and Florida responses to the NASAA Enforcement
Survey—Covering the 2017 Calendar Year (on file with author).

135

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Self-directed IRAs/other third-party
custodians
Binary options
Stock/equity options
Stocks and similar equities
Stream-of-income investments (e.g., pension
rights)
Structured products
Cryptocurrencies/initial coin offerings (ICOs)
Other
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1

0

7

1

0

0

3

0
0
0

0
35
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
8

1
1
3

1

0

0

2

0

1

2

1
1
0

0
0
0

0
2
7

0
3
0

0
0
0

0
2
0

1
0
3
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Table 5: Jurisdiction, leadership, and structure of state
securities regulators.
Jurisdiction
Agency
Alabama
Securities Commission
Alaska
Department of Comm.,
Cmty. and Econ. Dev.
Division of Banking and
Securities
Arizona
Arizona Corporation
Commission
Securities Division
Arkansas
Department of Commerce
State Securities
Department
California
Department of Business
Oversight
Division of Corporations
Colorado
Department of Regulatory
Agencies
Division of Securities
Connecticut
Department of Banking
Securities and Business
Investments Division
Delaware
Department of Justice
(Attorney General)
Fraud & Consumer
Protection Division
Investor Protection Unit
District of Columbia
Department of Insurance,
Securities and Banking
Florida
Office of Financial
Regulation
Division of Securities

Sec.

Sec./
Fin.

Leadership
Sec./
Other

✖

Appt

Elect

Structure
Exec

Comm’n

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖
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Georgia
Secretary of State
Securities Division
Hawaii
Department of Comm. and
Consumer Affairs
Business Registration
Division
Idaho
Department of Finance
Securities Bureau
Illinois
Secretary of State
Securities Department
Indiana
Secretary of State
Securities Division
Iowa
Insurance Division
Kansas
Insurance Department
Office of the Securities
Commissioner
Kentucky
Department of Financial
Institutions
Securities Division
Louisiana
Office of Financial
Institutions
Securities Division
Maine
Department of
Professional and Fin. Reg.
Office of Securities
Maryland
Attorney General
Securities Division
Massachusetts
Secretary of the
Commonwealth
Securities Division
Michigan
Department of Licensing
and Reg. Affairs
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✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖
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Securities Division
Minnesota
Commerce Department
Securities Unit
Mississippi
Secretary of State
Securities Division
Missouri
Secretary of State
Securities Division
Montana
State Auditor
Commissioner of
Securities and Insurance
Nebraska
Department of Banking
and Finance
Bureau of Securities
Nevada
Secretary of State
Securities Division
New Hampshire
Secretary of State
Bureau of Securities
Regulation
New Jersey
Attorney General
Bureau of Securities
New Mexico
Regulation and Licensing
Department
Securities Division
New York
Attorney General
Investor Protection Bureau
North Carolina
Secretary of State
Securities Division
North Dakota
Securities Department
Ohio
Department of Commerce
Division of Securities
Oklahoma
Securities Commissioner/
Department of Securities
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✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖
✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖
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Oregon
Division of Financial
Regulation
Pennsylvania
Department of Banking
and Securities
Rhode Island
Department of Business
Regulation
Securities Regulation
South Carolina
Attorney General
Securities Division
South Dakota
Department of Labor and
Regulation
Division of Insurance –
Securities Regulation
Tennessee
Department of Commerce
and Insurance
Securities Division
Texas
State Securities Board
Utah
Department of Commerce
Division of Securities
Vermont
Department of Financial
Regulation
Securities Division
Virginia
State Corporation
Commission
Washington
Department of Financial
Institutions
Division of Securities
West Virginia
State Auditor
Securities Commission
Wisconsin
Department of Financial
Institutions
Division of Securities
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✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖
✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

141
Wyoming
Secretary of State
Compliance Division
TOTALS
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✖
3

16

32

34

✖

✖

17

46

5

141

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:1 (2021)

Table 6: State securities regulators’ enforcement staffing.302
2017 or
2018 Enforcement Staffing

DE*

FL*

MI

MN

RI

SD

WI

Attorneys/Accountants/
Analysts/Investigators/Other
Non-Administrative
Personnel

12

113

20

3

5

3

8

Total Personnel

12

133

23

3

6

3

8

Table 7: State securities regulators’ complaints, investigations,
enforcement actions, and investor monetary relief.303
Year

Complaint
s

C→I304

Investigations

Enforcement
Actions

2018
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012

5,514
7,988
9,256
—
11,340
9,693
10,272

96.5%
59.96%
46.90%
—
42.80%
54.70%
57.01%

5,320
4,790
4,341
5,000
4,853
5,302
5,865

1,872
2,105
2,017
2,074
2,042
2,184
2,496

Investor
Monetary
Relief
$558m
$486m
$230m
$538m
$405m
$616m
$694m

Penalties
Imposed
$490m
$79m
$682m
$230m
$174m
$75m
$157m

302. These data are extracted from the Michigan, Minnesota, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, and Wisconsin responses to the NASAA Enforcement Survey—Covering the 2018
Calendar Year and from the Delaware and Florida responses to the NASAA Enforcement
Survey—Covering the 2017 Calendar Year (on file with author).
303. These statistics are excerpted from NASAA annual enforcement surveys from 2013,
2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019 (on file with author and available at Enforcement Statistics,
N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, https://www.nasaa.org/policy/enforcement-statistics (last visited
Oct. 17, 2021)). Enforcement actions include administrative, civil, criminal, and “other,” but
they do not include licenses withdrawn, denied, revoked, suspended, or conditioned.
304. Not all investigations are sourced from complaints. The C→I ratio does provide
an upper bound for how often a complaint develops into an investigation.
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Table 8: State securities regulators’ case sourcing and referrals.305
2017 or
2018 Sourcing
Complaints/tips/inquiries
Referrals In
SEC
FINRA
DOJ/FBI/IRS/Postal
Inspectors/Secret Service
CFPB/FTC
State/local law
enforcement/prosecutors/AG
State agency (insurance,
banking, etc.)
Other U.S. NASAA Member
Other

DE*

FL*

MI

MN

OK

SD

WI

UNK

421

142

205

44

UNK

93

0
0

56
1

8
9

1
7

7
1

2
1

0
1

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

17

1

5

1

4

0

7

6

0

1

1

4

0
1

1
0

0
0

4
0

1
0

0
0

5
1

0
0

4
19

0
0

1
1

1
0

1
0

2

0

0

0

0

1

1

2

0
0

0
0

0
0

4
1

0
0

0
0

0
1

3

0

37

0

1

0

6

0

1

0

0

2

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

1

0

58

0

0

0
1
0

0

0

Referrals Out
SEC
FINRA
DOJ/FBI/IRS/Postal
Inspectors/Secret Service
U.S. Department of Labor
CFPB/FTC
State/local law
enforcement/prosecutors/AG
State agency (insurance,
banking, etc.)
CFTC
Other U.S. NASAA Member
Other

305. These data are extracted from the Michigan, Minnesota, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
and Wisconsin responses to the NASAA Enforcement Survey—Covering the 2018 Calendar
Year and from the Delaware and Florida responses to the NASAA Enforcement Survey—
Covering the 2017 Calendar Year (on file with author).
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Table 9: State enforcement actions by violation type.306
2017 or 2018
enforcement actions
Fraud
(omissions/misrepresentations)
Unlicensed individuals or firms
Unregistered securities
Failure to supervise
Books and records
Suitability
Unauthorized trading
Churning
Selling away
Cybersecurity/
information security
Robo-adviser
Other dishonest/
unethical activity
Other violations

306. Id.

144

DE*

FL*

MI

MN

RI

SD

WI

5

33

8

19

0

1

18

3
1
0
1
1
0
0
0

69
15
2
105
0
5
0
1

31
43
1
0
0
1
0
0

11
6
3
0
6
0
0
0

1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

1
6
0
2
0
0
0
2

4
7
1
1
2
0
0
1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

83

5

4

1

1

0

0

0

4

0

0

0

0
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Table 10: Respondents named in state enforcement actions by
type.307
Violation Type
Broker-dealer firm
Broker-dealer agent
Investment adviser firm
Investment adviser
representative
Unregistered firm
Unregistered individual

2012
225
189
181

2013
219
357
174

2014
156
230
146

2015
176
191
229

2016
144
186
157

2017
120
150
187

2018
119
126
204

158

176

190

168

133

190

96

576
(both)

667
(both)

675
(both)

348
443

260
344

310
365

195
279

Table 11: SEC enforcement actions by type.308
Violation Type
Broker-dealer
Delinquent filings
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Insider trading
Investment advisers/investment companies
Issuer reporting and disclosure
Market manipulation
Nat’l recognized statistical rating org.
Public-finance abuse
Securities offering
SRO/exchange
Transfer agent

2018
169
121
13
51
170
106
33
2
18
130
1
2

2018%
21%
15%
2%
6%
21%
13%
4%
~0%
2%
16%
~0%
~0%

307. These statistics are excerpted from NASAA annual enforcement surveys from
2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019 (on file with author and available at Enforcement
Statistics, supra note 303).
308. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2018 DIV. OF ENF’T ANN. REP. 20 (2018).
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Table 12: Enforcer salience.309
If you or someone close to you experienced financial loss in connection with their
investments, and that loss seemed at least partly caused by someone else’s wrongdoing,
which of the following places would you go to or recommend going to for help? (select
all that apply) (all but last two options randomized)
Suburban
Rural
Total
Urban
A private attorney
Better Business Bureau
Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)
The employer of the
wrongdoer
Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority
(FINRA)
The local police department
The state securities regulator
Social media
A local prosecutor’s office
The state attorney general
A press or media outlet
The state police
The state insurance regulator
A federal prosecutor’s office
Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI)
American Association of
Retired Persons (AARP)
Someone else
None of these

55 (36.18%)
33 (21.71%)

82 (42.27%)
47 (24.23%)

31 (47.47%)
20 (27.40%)

168 (40.10%)
100 (23.87%)

27 (17.76%)

40 (24.23%)

15 (27.40%)

82 (19.57%)

23 (15.13%)

43 (22.16%)

16 (21.92%)

82 (19.57%)

29 (19.08%)

32 (16.49%)

13 (17.81%)

74 (17.66%)

29 (19.08%)
23 (15.13%)
27 (17.76%)
24 (15.79%)
11 (7.24%)
15 (9.87%)
17 (11.18%)
11 (7.24%)
13 (8.55%)

24 (12.37%)
31 (15.98%)
28 (14.43%)
25 (12.89%)
23 (9.28%)
19 (9.79%)
10 (5.15%)
18 (9.28%)
11 (5.67%)

18 (24.66%)
13 (17.81%)
12 (16.44%)
12 (16.44%)
13 (10.96%)
12 (16.44%)
13 (17.81%)
8 (10.96%)
11 (15.07%)

71 (16.95%)
67 (15.99%)
67 (15.99%)
61 (14.56%)
47 (11.22%)
46 (10.98%)
40 (9.55%)
37 (8.83%)
35 (8.35%)

13 (8.55%)

9 (4.64%)

10 (13.70%)

32 (7.64%)

9 (5.92%)

11 (5.67%)

8 (10.96%)

28 (6.68%)

11 (7.24%)
44 (28.95%)

10 (5.15%)
46 (23.71%)

5 (6.85%)
22 (30.14%)

26 (6.21%)
112 (26.73%)

309. A survey was conducted on the Amazon MTurk platform of 419 U.S. residents
aged 18 or over. Respondents were asked the question in Table 10 with the following
clarifying definition: “People ‘close to you’ include your friends, family, coworkers,
members of your religious community, neighbors, and other people you interact with on a
regular basis.” The question, the clarifying definition, and the response options were
designed to describe common types of securities violations in terms that would be accessible
to a lay person. Respondents were also asked to classify the place where they live as urban
(152), suburban (194), or rural (73).
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State Securities Enforcement

Table 13: Selected multistate enforcement actions and relief.310
Year
1993
2003
2008
2010
2012
2012
2012
2013
2015
2015
2018

Multistate Action
Prudential Securities Settlement
Global Research-Analyst Settlement
Auction Rate Securities
Morgan Keegan
Bankers Life
Uvest
ProEquities
UBS Financial Services
LPL Financial
Citigroup Global Markets
LPL Financial

State Relief
$26m
$487m
$605m
$10m
$9.9m
$750k
$435k
$4.6m
$2.8m
$1.9m

Investor Relief
$330m
$387m
$61b (repurchase)
$200m
—
—
—
—
—
—
$26m

310. Excerpted from Email from Interviewee #18 (on file with author).
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